836 F.3d 504
5th Cir.2016Background
- Donald Hensley Jr. was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 60 years; a later habitual-offender finding produced a life-without-parole sentence affirmed on direct appeal.
- State postconviction relief was denied; Hensley filed a federal § 2254 habeas petition in 2007.
- The district court rejected most claims but found ineffective assistance of counsel in the habitual-offender proceeding, vacated the life sentence, reinstated the original 60-year sentence, and remanded for a discretionary new habitual-offender hearing (which the State declined to hold).
- Hensley sought authorization from the Fifth Circuit to file a new § 2254 petition attacking his underlying conviction as “second or successive.”
- The central question was whether the district court’s vacatur of the habitual-offender life sentence and simultaneous reinstatement of the original 60-year term produced a new, intervening judgment that would allow a second-in-time habeas petition without circuit authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the post-district-court action created a “new judgment” so Hensley could file a successive § 2254 without authorization | The district court’s vacatur of the life sentence and reinstatement of the original 60-year sentence produced a new judgment permitting a new petition | The adjustment did not constitute a new judgment; Magwood’s “new judgment” rule does not apply here | Not a new judgment; Hensley needs circuit authorization to file a successive petition |
| Whether Hensley can satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(A) via Martinez v. Ryan | Martinez announced a new rule recognizing ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-counsel as a means to excuse procedural default; Martinez should be a basis to permit the successive petition | Martinez is not a new rule of constitutional law rendered retroactive on collateral review; Fifth Circuit precedent treats Martinez as equitable and not retroactive | Martinez not a new, retroactive constitutional rule; Hensley’s successive petition is barred |
| Whether Martinez has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review | Martinez was retroactively recognized by Hensley as applicable to his situation | The Supreme Court has not made Martinez retroactive; Fifth Circuit decisions hold it is not retroactive | Martinez is not retroactive for collateral review in this circuit; claim fails |
| Whether Hensley met the § 2244(b)(2)(B) factual-predicate/actual-innocence standard | Hensley did not raise an alternative showing under (B) | The State argues Hensley made no showing of newly discoverable facts or proof of actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence | Hensley did not make the (B) showing; authorization denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (clarifies “second or successive” when a petition challenges a new judgment)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (not all second-in-time petitions are “second or successive”)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (creates narrow equitable exception for ineffective postconviction counsel but not a new constitutional rule made retroactive)
- In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585 (Fifth Circuit: new judgment inquiry focuses on whether a new sentence was imposed)
- United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483 (modification that is not a full resentencing does not create a new judgment)
- In re Sepulvado, 707 F.3d 550 (Martinez is not a new constitutional rule)