In re Detention of Lieberman
2017 IL App (1st) 160962
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Brad Lieberman was civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act after a 2006 jury finding that he suffered from paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) and antisocial personality features and posed a substantial risk to reoffend.
- The Act requires periodic reexaminations; in 2013 Dr. Kimberly Weitl reexamined Lieberman (he refused to be interviewed) and diagnosed him with sexual sadism and antisocial personality disorder under DSM-5, concluding he remained substantially likely to reoffend.
- Dr. Weitl explained the shift to a sexual sadism label reflected DSM-5 guidance permitting diagnosis despite denial of sexual arousal when objective evidence indicates otherwise; she did not disavow the prior PNOS characterization and testified Lieberman’s underlying symptoms had not changed.
- Lieberman petitioned for discharge, arguing (1) the State could not "change" the disorder basis for his commitment (PNOS → sexual sadism), (2) the change violated due process and res judicata, and (3) the State untimely disclosed the 2013 reexamination report and should be sanctioned.
- The trial court found Lieberman failed to show a plausible account of changed circumstances entitling him to a probable-cause hearing, denied discharge, and refused sanctions for the report’s timing. Lieberman appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lieberman) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a change from PNOS to sexual sadism requires discharge | Change in diagnosis means the original disorder no longer exists; State cannot unilaterally alter commitment basis | Diagnosis evolution reflects better description of same underlying disorder/symptoms; change does not show condition changed | No probable cause; a relabeling or refinement of diagnosis alone is not a changed circumstance warranting discharge |
| Whether change in diagnosis violated due process (inconsistent with jury verdict) | Sexual sadism was not found by jury; continued confinement inconsistent with original verdict | Jury found a mental disorder and dangerousness, not a specific DSM label; current findings are consistent | No due process violation; current evidence of mental disorder and dangerousness consistent with verdict |
| Whether res judicata bars State from asserting new diagnosis | State should have alleged sexual sadism at original trial; res judicata prevents changing diagnosis later | Reexamination statute contemplates evaluating changed conditions, including diagnostic refinements | Res judicata inapplicable; subsequent reexamination considers new facts/knowledge and whether condition changed since commitment |
| Whether State’s late filing of 2013 report required sanctions or discharge | Late disclosure prejudiced Lieberman and warrants dismissal/release or other sanctions (Brady and professional rules) | Report was not favorable to Lieberman; delay was not materially prejudicial; reexamination timing is directory, not mandatory | No sanctions or release; late filing caused no prejudice and annual-report deadline is directory, not a bar to proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337 (clarifies burden in postcommitment discharge proceedings and that movant must show a plausible account of changed circumstances)
- In re Detention of Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 585 (affirming initial commitment) (discusses proof required for commitment)
- Hardin v. Illinois Dept. of Mental Health, 238 Ill. 2d 33 (explains "plausible account" standard in civil commitment contexts)
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (due process limits on involuntary confinement require both mental illness and dangerousness)
- Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287 (res judicata prevents relitigation of same cause of action)
- Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462 (res judicata elements and application)
- Beaman v. Page, 229 Ill. 2d 56 (Brady standard and analysis of materiality in disclosure contexts)
- Sease v. State, 357 P.3d 1088 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (diagnostic relabeling does not alone show changed condition; statute requires change in condition, not label)