In re Det. of Belcher
93900-4
| Wash. | Aug 17, 2017Background
- Troy Belcher was adjudicated for two sexually violent offenses as a juvenile (rape and attempted rape) and later committed to the Special Commitment Center as an SVP after a 2011 jury trial.
- In 2015 a bench trial found he continued to meet SVP criteria; expert Dr. Judd diagnosed Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) with high psychopathy, gave a provisional paraphilia, and used the VRAG‑R actuarial tool to assess risk.
- The trial court found (1) the juvenile adjudications satisfied the predicate offense requirement, (2) ASPD with high psychopathy constituted a mental abnormality impairing volitional control, and (3) Belcher was more likely than not to reoffend.
- Belcher appealed, arguing due process violations: (a) juvenile-only predicate offenses cannot support continued commitment, (b) ASPD alone is insufficient to show a mental abnormality that impairs control, and (c) VRAG‑R (based on sexual and nonsexual crimes) cannot reliably show likelihood of future sexually violent offenses.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all issues.
Issues
| Issue | Belcher's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can juvenile-only sexually violent adjudications serve as predicate offenses for continued SVP commitment? | Using juvenile-only offenses to continue indefinite commitment violates due process; juveniles lack volitional maturity. | The SVP statute provides ongoing review and release mechanisms; juvenile adjudications are not statutorily excluded. | Juvenile adjudications may serve as predicate offenses for continued commitment under RCW 71.09.090. |
| Is a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) sufficient to prove the statutory "mental abnormality"? | ASPD alone is an insufficient basis for commitment; "ASPD with high psychopathy" is not a valid diagnosis. | ASPD (with evidence of severe impairment and psychopathy traits) can show the requisite lack of control under the statute. | ASPD (here with high psychopathy and clinical findings) satisfies the statute as a mental abnormality/personality disorder. |
| May a finder rely on an actuarial instrument (VRAG‑R) built on sexual and nonsexual offenses to assess likelihood of future sexually violent acts? | VRAG‑R predicts general violent recidivism, not specifically sexual reoffense; thus it cannot satisfy statutory/due process requirements. | Actuarial tools are admissible expert evidence; limitations affect weight, not admissibility; VRAG‑R can be considered alongside clinical testimony. | Use of VRAG‑R did not violate due process when considered with clinical evaluation and other evidence. |
| Did the trial court violate due process in its overall finding of continued SVP status? | Aggregate of alleged defects (juvenile predicates, ASPD diagnosis, VRAG‑R) made the commitment unconstitutional. | The court relied on multiple sources of evidence and statutory safeguards; burden of proof and procedural protections satisfied due process. | The trial court's finding that Belcher remains an SVP is affirmed; due process requirements met. |
Key Cases Cited
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (due process applies to continued confinement after criminal acquittal)
- Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (liberty interest and due process in civil commitment contexts)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (civil commitment of sexually violent predators requires proof of mental abnormality)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (need to show serious difficulty in controlling behavior for civil commitment)
- In re Det. of Thorell, 149 Wn.2d 724 (Washington standards for actuarial evidence and psychiatric predictions in SVP proceedings)
- State v. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d 369 (Washington SVP statute facially complies with due process)
- In re Det. of Anderson, 185 Wn.2d 79 (juvenile adjudications may serve as predicate offenses in certain SVP contexts)
- In re Det. of Campbell, 139 Wn.2d 341 (trial court may weigh multiple sources of expert and clinical evidence in SVP findings)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (juvenile sentencing jurisprudence on diminished culpability)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juvenile sentencing and Eighth Amendment principles)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (juvenile developmental differences relevant to punishment)