In re Deshawn G.
40 N.E.3d 762
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Respondent (16 at the time) was charged with three counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) for possessing a handgun on Dec. 31, 2013; the State proceeded on two Class 2 counts: (a) possessing a firearm without a FOID card and (b) possessing a firearm while under 21.
- The State filed notice seeking classification and disposition as a Violent Juvenile Offender (VJO) under 705 ILCS 405/5-820 based on a prior 2012 adjudication for aggravated robbery.
- At trial police officers testified they chased respondent, observed him fall, saw him reach into snow, and another officer recovered a loaded 9mm handgun from the snow; respondent did not testify.
- The State introduced a certified Illinois State Police record showing respondent never had a FOID card; the trial court admitted the certification over a confrontation objection.
- A jury found respondent delinquent on both AUUW counts; at disposition the court sentenced him under the VJO statute to confinement in DOJJ until age 21 (with day-for-day credit).
- On appeal respondent raised: (1) AUUW subsections severability/Aguilar challenge; (2) facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the VJO provision; (3) confrontation clause challenge to the FOID certification; and (4) one-act, one-crime double-adjudication claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Severability of AUUW subsections after Aguilar | AUUW subsections (a)(3)(C) and (I) are valid under the post-amendment statute and severable | (a)(3)(C) and (I) are inseverable from pre-amendment (a)(3)(A) struck down in People v. Aguilar, so they are unconstitutional | Court rejected respondent; Aguilar did not apply to the amended statute and IL Supreme Court decisions (Mosley, In re Jordan G.) upheld (C) and (I) |
| Facial constitutionality of VJO statute (5-820) — due process / equal protection / Eighth Amendment / proportionate penalties | VJO is a legislative policy judgment to protect public and hold repeat serious juvenile offenders accountable; statute is presumptively constitutional | VJO is a mandatory, "one-size-fits-all" penalty that ignores youth characteristics (Miller/Graham/Roper) and thus violates substantive due process, equal protection, and Eighth/Illinois proportionate penalties clause | Court upheld VJO facially, following binding precedent (Chrastka, In re M.G., Patterson); Roper/Graham/Miller limited to most severe penalties (life without parole/death) and do not invalidate VJO mandatory term to age 21 |
| As-applied challenge to VJO (consider respondent’s individual youth and rehabilitation) | State: no evidentiary hearing below; as-applied claim not properly preserved for appellate adjudication | Respondent: sentencing court was denied ability to consider his youth, reform, and rehabilitative progress | Court declined to decide as-applied claim due to absence of factfinding/hearing; limited review to facial challenge only |
| Admission of FOID certification (Confrontation Clause) and one-act, one-crime double adjudication | State: certification is self-authenticating and admissible; but if constitutional issue avoided, vacate the lesser AUUW adjudication under one-act, one-crime | Respondent: FOID certification was testimonial hearsay by a non-testifying declarant and admission violated Crawford; also two AUUW adjudications arise from single physical act and violate one-act, one-crime | Court avoided confrontation ruling by resolving one-act, one-crime: vacated the FOID-based AUUW count (lesser or redundant count) and affirmed remaining AUUW adjudication and VJO sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (declaring pre-amendment AUUW provision unconstitutional as to bearing a loaded firearm outside the home for self-defense)
- People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872 (Illinois Supreme Court: subsections (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I) of AUUW do not violate Second Amendment and are severable)
- In re Jordan G., 2015 IL 116834 (Illinois Supreme Court: similar holding re: AUUW subsections and severability)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; sentencing must allow consideration of youth)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders)
- People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102 (Ill. S. Ct.: limits of Roper/Graham/Miller; automatic transfer and mandatory schemes discussed; Roper/Graham/Miller apply narrowly to the most severe penalties)
- Chrastka v. Carey, 83 Ill. 2d 67 (1980) (upholding mandatory dispositions for repeat juvenile offenders; legislative authority to set minimum juvenile sentences)
- In re M.G., 301 Ill. App. 3d 401 (1998) (First Dist. appellate decision upholding constitutionality of VJO provision)