946 F.3d 335
6th Cir.2020Background
- Dean Boland, a lawyer and image-forensics expert, digitally morphed innocuous stock photos of two girls (Doe and Roe) into sexually explicit images and used those doctored images as courtroom exhibits in defense of criminal clients.
- Federal prosecutors treated the morphed images as child pornography; Boland signed a pre-trial diversion agreement admitting he violated federal child-pornography law by morphing images that depicted real minors.
- Doe and Roe sued under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and obtained a combined $300,000 statutory-damages judgment based on Boland’s admissions and the statutory presumption of injury.
- Boland filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy; Doe and Roe sought to except the § 2255 judgment from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (willful and malicious injury). The bankruptcy court discharged the judgment, finding Boland lacked knowledge that the images depicted real minors and that he did not “use” them after his Oklahoma testimony.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error, concluded the court plainly erred (crediting Boland’s implausible testimony over documentary admissions and the diversion agreement), and held the § 2255 judgment nondischargeable because Boland acted with substantial certainty his conduct would injure the minors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a § 2255 statutory-damages judgment is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) | Boland knowingly morphed images of real minors and used them in court; injury is legally presumed under § 2255, so the judgment is willful and malicious | Boland lacked knowledge the images depicted real minors and did not intend to harm the children | Judgment is nondischargeable: injury presumed and Boland was substantially certain his acts would injure the minors |
| Whether the bankruptcy court clearly erred in crediting Boland’s testimony that he didn’t use the images after Oklahoma | Documentary evidence (diversion agreement, discovery admissions, prior appellate opinions) proves Boland continued to use the images in Ohio courts | Boland claimed he had no control over sealed exhibits and therefore did not “use” them after Oklahoma | Bankruptcy court clearly erred: objective record shows Boland used the images after his Oklahoma testimony |
| Whether the bankruptcy court clearly erred in finding Boland did not know the images depicted real minors | Admissions (diversion agreement and discovery) and circumstantial evidence show Boland knew or should have known the photos depicted real minors | Boland testified it is impossible to visually determine whether an image is of a real minor (claiming metaphysical uncertainty) | Bankruptcy court clearly erred: Boland’s explanation was implausible and contradicted by documentary admissions |
| Whether subjective intent to harm is required for "willful and malicious" or whether substantial certainty suffices | Substantial certainty suffices because § 523(a)(6) imports tort-law intent: knowing acts substantially certain to cause injury qualify | Boland argued he intended to educate/defend, not to harm, so lacked intent to injure the children | Substantial certainty is enough; even benign purpose does not negate that one was substantially certain injury would result; thus exception applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (§ 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely an intentional act)
- Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (creditor bears burden to prove nondischargeability)
- In re Markowitz, 190 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1999) (remand to determine debtor’s knowledge where malpractice injury disputed; knowledge requirement explained)
- In re Kennedy, 249 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2001) (defamation per se judgments excepted from discharge where debtor knew statements were actionable; injury presumed)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (standard for clear-error review of factual findings)
- Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2012) (prior appellate treatment of Boland’s conduct and statutory-damages holding)