In Re: Dawn Segal, Judge
173 A.3d 603
Pa.2017Background
- Judge Dawn Segal (Philadelphia Municipal Court) engaged in repeated ex parte telephone communications with fellow Judge Joseph Waters (2011–2012) in which Waters requested favorable treatment for specific litigants; calls were recorded by an FBI wiretap.
- Stipulated facts and recordings show Segal acknowledged the calls, asked questions, often ruled in ways favorable to Waters’ requests, and phoned Waters afterward to report results; she did not disclose the communications, recuse, or report Waters promptly.
- Segal cooperated with federal investigators, testified before a grand jury without immunity, and later self-reported to the Judicial Conduct Board; Waters pleaded guilty to federal fraud charges.
- The Judicial Conduct Board charged Segal with violations of the former Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons 2B, 3A(4), 3B(3), 3C(1)) and Article V, Sections 17(b) and 18(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Administration of Justice and Disrepute clauses).
- The Court of Judicial Discipline (CJD) found all violations proved, emphasized Segal’s knowing participation and implication that Waters could influence her, and imposed removal from office and a permanent bar from judicial service.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed: it applied deferential review to CJD credibility and sanction decisions, concluded the misconduct warranted removal, and rejected arguments that absence of actual biased rulings or character testimony required leniency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Segal) | Defendant's Argument (Board/CJD) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Segal violated Canon 3A(4) (no consideration of ex parte communications) | Segal: she did not actually act on or let the calls affect her rulings, so she did not “consider” them | CJD: consideration need not change the result; acknowledging and responding to requests shows consideration | Held: Violation — recordings and admissions show Segal considered the ex parte contacts |
| Whether Segal violated Canon 3C(1) (disqualify when impartiality might reasonably be questioned) | Segal: lack of proof she acted with actual partiality; rulings were consistent with ordinary practice | CJD: appearance of partiality suffices; her conduct created reasonable questions about impartiality | Held: Violation — appearance of bias established; actual bias not required |
| Whether Segal breached duty to report (Canon 3B(3)) and prejudiced administration of justice / brought office into disrepute (Art. V §18(d)(1)) | Segal: delayed reporting due to federal confidentiality request; misconduct did not prejudice outcomes | CJD: duty to report arose when contacts occurred; undisclosed favoritism deprived litigants of recusal opportunity and harmed public confidence | Held: Violations proved — nondisclosure and conduct prejudiced administration and brought office into disrepute |
| Whether removal was lawful/proportionate and whether CJD had to follow stare decisis in sanctions | Segal: removal disproportionate compared to other cases; CJD failed to meaningfully consider mitigating evidence; CJD did not apply stare decisis | CJD/Pa. S. Ct.: sanction discretionary but must be lawful; CJD may weigh public-protection interest over character evidence; sanction lawful given pattern and serious effect on integrity | Held: Affirmed — removal lawful; appellate review is deferential on discretionary sanctions; dissent argued CJD should have applied stare decisis to sanctions |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Carney, 621 Pa. 476, 79 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2013) (discusses due process and standards in judicial discipline reviews)
- In re Berkhimer, 593 Pa. 366, 930 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2007) (explains disrepute standard for judicial misconduct)
- In re Chiovero, 524 Pa. 181, 570 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1990) (addresses distinction between unwitting participants and culpable jurists)
- In re Deming, 108 Wash.2d 82, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (provides multi-factor framework for assessing judicial discipline sanctions)
- In re Roca, 173 A.3d 1176 (Pa. 2017) (companion decision addressing appellate review standard and stare decisis question in discipline cases)
