In re Davon R., 2017 IL App (1st) 170426

Child born July 13, 2013; removed April 27, 2015 after hospital found him emaciated and diagnosed with non-organic failure to thrive; State filed petition for adjudication of wardship.
Father (respondent) was indigent and court-appointed counsel (Monica Torres) was assigned May 4, 2015; child placed first with relative then nonrelative foster care and continued to have weight issues.
Counsel filed a written motion to withdraw on September 29, 2015 but later withdrew that motion and continued representation; tensions and communications problems between counsel and respondent followed.
On January 29, 2016, at a hearing after an attorney-only conference, counsel stated she would withdraw; the court vacated counsel’s appointment on counsel’s oral motion and proceeded without continuing to allow respondent time to obtain new counsel.
Respondent repeatedly declined offers of a bar attorney at later hearings and appeared pro se; he was absent from the dispositional hearing on January 13, 2017 and the court adjudicated the child a ward and found respondent "unable only to parent".
Appellate court reversed and remanded, holding the trial court erred in allowing counsel’s oral withdrawal without complying with Rule 13 and without giving respondent time to secure counsel.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court properly vacated court-appointed counsel’s appointment before adjudication	State: no waiver; proceedings otherwise proper	Father: counsel’s oral withdrawal violated Rule 13; he was deprived of statutory right to appointed counsel	Vacatur of counsel on oral motion was error; Rule 13 requirements were not met and respondent was not afforded time to obtain new counsel
Whether respondent waived the right to complain about counsel’s withdrawal by failing to object below	State: respondent’s appellate claim is waived for failure to object	Father: waiver rules should not bar review because parental rights are fundamental	Court declined to apply waiver doctrine and addressed the claim on the merits
Whether lack of counsel requires reversal per se or was harmless	State: any error was harmless or cured by later offers of counsel	Father: error was prejudicial (unchallenged testimony introduced after withdrawal)	Court reversed without reaching harmlessness analysis because procedural error alone required remand
Whether Rule 13 procedures (written motion, notice, 21-day continuance) applied	State: not argued to defeat Rule 13 applicability	Father: Rule 13 governs withdrawal and was not followed	Court held Rule 13 applies and its procedures were not followed; withdrawal on oral motion improper

In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364 (Illinois 2005) (waiver rules are limitations on parties and courts may consider issues to reach a just result)
In re Marriage of Sutton, 136 Ill. 2d 441 (Illinois 1990) (same principle regarding waiver)
In re Darius G., 406 Ill. App. 3d 727 (Ill. App. Ct.) (discussing waiver and appellate review in juvenile context)
In re Timpone, 208 Ill. 2d 371 (Illinois 2004) (courts may override waiver to achieve justice)
In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 (Illinois 2005) (parental rights are fundamental)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (recognition of parental liberty interest)
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (U.S. 1942) (parental rights and fundamental liberty)
In re Robert S., 357 Ill. App. 3d 214 (Ill. App. Ct.) (Rule 13 requires 21-day continuance after withdrawal to let party secure counsel)
In re J.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 652 (Ill. App. Ct.) (motion to withdraw must meet Rule 13’s minimum requirements)
In re Travarius O., 343 Ill. App. 3d 844 (Ill. App. Ct.) (distinguishable facts where multiple appointed attorneys were involved)