In re: David P.
170 A.3d 818
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2017Background
- Juvenile David P. was found by a Wicomico County juvenile court to be involved in attempted first-degree arson and reckless endangerment for lighting two matches and dropping them on the brick stoop of neighbor Nuzhat Nada’s house after creating a disturbance at her door.
- Nada observed David running from her porch multiple times; on the final occasion she saw two lit matches burning on the bricks about 1½ feet from her door and nearby combustible materials (wicker mat, wood, pinecones, dry leaves).
- Nada stayed at the stoop watching the matches and did not immediately extinguish them; police found two extinguished matches on the concrete landing.
- The State prosecuted David for attempted first‑degree arson (specific intent required) and reckless endangerment; the case proceeded to a bench trial in juvenile court.
- The juvenile court found David involved in both offenses and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Services; David appealed claiming insufficiency of the evidence.
- The Court of Special Appeals reversed both findings, concluding the State failed to prove the specific intent required for attempted arson and failed to show a substantial risk required for reckless endangerment; the court did not reach the suppression issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency for attempted first‑degree arson (attempt) | State: lighting and dropping lit matches near the mat constituted a substantial step from which specific intent to burn the dwelling can be inferred. | David: two matches on a nonflammable brick landing show juvenile mischief, not the specific intent to willfully and maliciously burn the house. | Reversed — evidence insufficient. Court held State failed to prove the specific intent to harm property or person required for arson/attempt. |
| Sufficiency for reckless endangerment | State: lit matches near combustible materials could have caused house fire or injury to Nada; her presence merely prevented harm. | David: matches rested on nonflammable surface and overwhelmingly likely to self‑extinguish; risk of harm was too remote to be "substantial." | Reversed — evidence insufficient. Court held risk was not a substantial risk of death or serious injury under objective standard. |
| Admissibility of show‑up identification | State: identification was proper (argued below). | David: challenged the show‑up as tainted by neighbor statements (raised on appeal). | Not reached — reversal on sufficiency mooted this issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354 (2001) (defines statutory mens rea for arson after legislative revisions: "maliciously" requires intent to harm person or property)
- Richmond v. State, 326 Md. 257 (1992) (previously held reckless conduct could satisfy arson mens rea; superseded in part by Holbrook and later statutory language)
- Spencer v. State, 450 Md. 530 (2016) (specific intent distinguished from mere knowledge that a result is substantially certain)
- In re Elrich S., 416 Md. 15 (2010) (standards for appellate review in juvenile delinquency matters)
- Grill v. State, 337 Md. 91 (1995) (elements for criminal attempt and required intent)
- Young v. State, 303 Md. 298 (1985) (attempt to commit a specific intent crime requires the same specific intent as the completed crime)
- Perry v. State, 229 Md. App. 687 (2016) (elements and objective test for reckless endangerment; substantial‑risk analysis)
- Moulden v. State, 212 Md. App. 331 (2013) (discusses when handling a firearm creates a substantial risk; analogies applied to other dangerous conduct)