In re David
135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855
Cal. Ct. App.2012Background
- Petitioner Terrance David, convicted in 1989 of second-degree murder (implied malice) for fatalities caused while under PCP influence; paroled in 2010 and supervised by CDCR/DAPO.
- Parole condition restricted his residence to 35 miles away from the victim’s next of kin, Elizabeth Coral, under Penal Code section 3003(f).
- The Board initially allowed residence with his family, but Coral requested the 35-mile restriction; the Board implemented the restriction after Coral’s written request.
- David resided in Burbank (within 35 miles of Coral) until the restriction was reinstated, following the victim’s sister’s request; the Board noted the victims’ families’ well-being as a basis.
- Superior Court held that the term “victim” in Art. I, § 28(e) of the California Constitution defined Coral as a victim for purposes of 3003(f).
- Petitioner challenged the restriction as misapplied; the court ultimately granted habeas corpus and rescinded the 35-mile restriction, finding 3003(f) inapplicable here and the restriction not reasonably related to the crime, deterrence, or life/safety.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 3003(f) applies to a murder victim’s next of kin | David argues Coral is a victim under Art. I, §28(e) and can trigger 3003(f) | CDCR asserts 3003(f) applies only to the victim or witness, not next of kin | No; 3003(f) does not extend to next of kin under the constitution and statute |
| Whether 3003(f) can be applied as a parole condition given its relation to the crime | The restriction is necessary to protect the victim’s well-being | Parole may impose residency restrictions if reasonably related to the crime or deterring future crime | Not applicable here; the restriction lacks connection to the crime, deterrence, or safety of the victim’s family |
| Whether the restriction violates due process as a parole condition | The restriction is a valid, reasonable condition to safeguard well-being | Conditions of parole may be broader but must be reasonably related to rehabilitation and safety | Invalid; the restriction unduly burdens petitioner without relation to the crime or victim’s safety |
Key Cases Cited
- In re E.J., 47 Cal.4th 1258 (Cal. 2010) (parole conditions and habeas context; deference to prison authorities)
- In re Serrano, 10 Cal.4th 447 (Cal. 1995) (habeas corpus burden and standard of proof)
- People v. Sinohui, 28 Cal.4th 205 (Cal. 2002) (statutory construction and intent principles)
- In re Stevens, 119 Cal.App.4th 1228 (Cal. App. 2004) (parole conditions must be reasonably related to compelling state interests)
- Burgener v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.3d 505 (Cal. 1986) (parole conditions and constitutional due process)