In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452

Davenport (and related entities) engaged Hall and Dietzmann on a contingency-fee agreement to pursue claims arising from business dealings with Water Exploration Co. (WECO).
The agreement granted attorneys “an undivided interest in the above claim” equal to “Forty percent (40%) of the gross amount recovered,” defining “GROSS AMOUNT” as “the total sums recovered,” and contained an exception that attorneys would not take a fee out of ownership of two specified entities.
The attorneys obtained a $70 million verdict and later negotiated settlements; Davenport received monetary payments and ultimately acquired 100% of WECO, paying attorneys contingency fees on some monetary recoveries but not having transferred any ownership interest to them.
Attorneys sued Davenport for unpaid fees and expenses, seeking an ownership interest in WECO as part of their contingent fee; the jury found the agreement did not entitle them to an ownership interest and found for attorneys only on unpaid expenses.
The trial court granted a new trial, later explaining the agreement unambiguously entitled attorneys to an ownership interest; Davenport sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court held the trial court abused its discretion and ordered final judgment consistent with the jury verdict.

Issue	Davenport's Argument	Hall & Dietzmann's Argument	Held
Whether the contingency agreement unambiguously allowed attorneys to recover a non‑cash (ownership) interest as fees	Agreement limits fees to monetary recovery; "sums" means money, so no entitlement to ownership interest	Agreement grants an interest in the "claim" and the exception of two entities implies fees can be taken from other ownership interests	The agreement unambiguously authorizes only monetary recovery; attorneys are not entitled to ownership interest; trial court abused discretion in ordering new trial
Whether the trial court properly granted a new trial after the jury verdict	New trial was improper because contract interpretation favored Davenport as a matter of law	Trial court reasonably concluded contract unambiguously favored attorneys and therefore ordered new trial	Mandamus: trial court abused discretion; vacate new‑trial orders and render judgment consistent with opinion

In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2013) (standards for mandamus relief from new‑trial orders)
Anglo‑Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011) (fee agreements subject to close scrutiny; lawyer’s duty to be clear about noncash contingent fees)
In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009) (trial‑court new‑trial discretion principles)
In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2012) (requirements for adequate new‑trial explanation)
R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1980) (contract ambiguity is a question of law)
Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (when language is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, ambiguity exists and becomes a fact issue)
Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) (plain‑meaning rule; enforce unambiguous contract as written)