In Re Darren M.
426 P.3d 1021
Alaska2018Background
- In Aug. 2016 Darren removed his apartment window screen, told a relative he intended to jump, and was taken to Providence; he has diagnoses of bipolar disorder and Korsakoff syndrome.
- Providence petitioned for initial evaluation and Darren was committed to API for 30 days; the State later sought a 90‑day extension proceeding solely on a theory of grave disability.
- A six‑person jury found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Darren was mentally ill and gravely disabled; a subsequent bench hearing addressed whether treatment could improve his condition and whether a less‑restrictive alternative existed.
- API expert Gerald Martone testified Darren has permanent Korsakoff syndrome but had shown slight improvement with vitamin B1 and that bipolar‑related symptoms (agitation, paranoia, delusions) could improve with antipsychotic treatment.
- The superior court found by clear and convincing evidence there was reason to believe treatment could improve Darren’s condition and no less‑restrictive alternative existed, and ordered a 90‑day commitment.
- On appeal Darren argued (1) the jury unanimity instruction was legally erroneous because jurors were not required to agree on which statutory sub‑part supported grave disability and (2) the court erred in finding sufficient evidence that treatment could improve his condition and/or applied the wrong legal standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Darren) | Defendant's Argument (State/API) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury unanimity on grave‑disability basis | Court should have required jurors to agree on which statutory subdivision (neglect of basic needs vs. severe distress/incapacity) formed the finding | Jury instructions and verdict form mirrored those requested by Darren; no contemporaneous objection was made | Any instructional error was invited (Darren requested the instructions); claim waived; no exceptional circumstances warrant reversal |
| Required showing that treatment will/could improve condition (legal standard) | Commitment should require proof that treatment will improve respondent’s condition (a stronger, more definitive showing) | Statutory language and practicability support a showing that there is reason to believe treatment could improve the condition | Court held State must prove by clear and convincing evidence there is reason to believe the respondent’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought ("could," not "will") |
| Sufficiency of evidence that treatment could improve condition | Martone’s testimony that Korsakoff is irreversible and only 25% chance of slight improvement is too speculative to satisfy the burden | Martone also testified of observed slight improvement and expected treatment benefits for bipolar symptoms (agitation, paranoia, delusions); commitment aimed to enable those improvements | Trial record supplied substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that there was reason to believe treatment could improve Darren’s condition; finding not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007) (construing statutory "grave disability" standard to require incapacity to survive safely in freedom)
- E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009) (addressed whether showing of likely improvement with treatment is required in self‑harm cases and assumed requirement for grave disability cases)
- In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013) (held clear‑and‑convincing standard applies to findings relevant to involuntary commitment)
- Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1998) (party who proposed or approved jury instructions cannot later complain on appeal)