In Re Daniel
11 A.3d 291
| D.C. | 2011Background
- Daniel misused an IOLTA account (329) as a personal/business account, commingling client and personal funds, with withdrawals and payments for non-client items between 2000-2002.
- He maintained a separate escrow-for-clients account (676) and commingled funds there as well, including non-client withdrawals.
- The IRS questioned Daniel’s assets and he provided a false letter stating no open accounts; his statements were dishonest under Rule 8.4(c).
- Bar Counsel charged four counts: two for dishonest identification (8.4(c)) of accounts, one for commingling (1.15(a)), and one for dishonest/evading taxes (8.4(c) and potential 8.4(b)); later proceedings found two 8.4(c) violations.
- Hearing Committee found Rule 1.15(a) violation and one Rule 8.4(c) violation, but not 8.4(b); Board adopted findings but urged a one-year sanction, while Bar Counsel pressed for harsher discipline.
- This Court suspends Daniel for three years and conditions reinstatement on fitness, adopting an enhanced sanction and estate of mind concerns post-hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Daniel violated Rule 8.4(c) by dishonest tax-related conduct | Bar Counsel contends two 8.4(c) violations (accounts 329 and 676) | Daniel argues no misconduct beyond Board findings; denies additional 8.4(c) violations | Two 8.4(c) violations found; deceptive use of accounts established |
| Whether Daniel violated Rule 8.4(b) (criminal tax evasion) | Bar Counsel asserts criminal tax evasion evidenced by concealment | Daniel denies criminal tax statutes were violated | No violation of 8.4(b) proven by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether there was a Rule 1.15(a) commingling violation | Bar Counsel argues funds commingled in 329 as client funds | Daniel contests the breadth of commingling | Rule 1.15(a) violated; commingling proven |
| What sanction is appropriate given the misconduct | Board proposed 1-year suspension | Daniel seeks only minimal discipline; argues for lesser sanction | Three-year suspension with fitness condition for reinstatement |
| Whether fitness to practice should be imposed as a condition of reinstatement | Serious doubt about fitness warrants conditioning reinstatement | Less concern about future fitness; argues no fitness condition | Fitness conditioning required for reinstatement (Roundtree/Cater considerations) |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2005) (roundtree factors for fitness to practice)
- In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215 (D.C. 1985) (Five-factor test for serious doubt about fitness)
- In re Moore, 691 A.2d 1151 (D.C. 1997) (disbarment not automatic; comparison to disciplined conduct)
- In re Slattery, 767 A.2d 203 (D.C. 2001) (comparison of dishonesty and sanctions)
- In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458 (D.C. 1994) (contrition and seriousness of offenses in sanctioning)
- In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1987) (honesty essential; sanctions for serious dishonesty)
- In re Courtois, 931 A.2d 1015 (D.C. 2007) (reinstatement considerations after discipline)
- In re Powell, 898 A.2d 365 (D.C. 2006) (sanction posture with fitness condition in some cases)
- In re Wright, 885 A.2d 315 (D.C. 2005) (sanction posture with fitness condition in some cases)
- In re Brown, 851 A.2d 1278 (D.C. 2004) (sanction posture with fitness condition in some cases)