In re Dal D.
2017 IL App (4th) 160893
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In March 2015 DCFS removed Dal. D. (b. 2009) and Day. D. (b. 2008) after respondent Jennifer Durbin allowed Thomas Keist — a convicted, untreated sex offender — to stay in her home and have access to the children; respondent admitted the neglect allegations and the children were made wards of the court.
- Over multiple permanency hearings (Sept. 2015–May 2016) the court found Durbin remained involved with Keist, was intermittently noncompliant with services (domestic-violence treatment, therapy, chaperone prerequisites), had legal/transportation/housing instability, and was sometimes untruthful about contact with Keist.
- DCFS changed the permanency goal from return to substitute care pending termination; the maternal grandmother (Bridgeforth) fostered the boys, providing stable care and expressing interest in adoption.
- In May 2016 the State petitioned to terminate Durbin’s parental rights alleging, among other grounds, failure to make reasonable progress toward return during a nine-month statutory period.
- At the August 2016 fitness hearing Durbin admitted the statutory ground of failure to make reasonable progress (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii)); the court accepted a factual basis referencing prior permanency orders, service-plan failures, jail visiting logs, and provider testimony.
- At an October 2016 best-interest hearing the court heard testimony about Durbin’s minimization of risk from Keist, her dishonesty, incomplete services, and the children’s stability with their grandmother; the trial court terminated Durbin’s parental rights. The appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Durbin) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of factual basis for fitness admission | The State’s brief factual presentation plus reliance on prior hearings and records adequately supported the admission to failure-to-make-progress ground. | The factual basis was insufficient because the State did not set out the underlying conditions leading to removal or connect them to Durbin’s parenting ability. | Court: State provided sufficient factual basis; trial court could rely on prior proceedings and documents. |
| Trial court’s obligation to state findings of fact on fitness | The court’s oral adoption of the State’s factual basis and Durbin’s admission satisfied statutory and due-process requirements. | The court failed to make written/oral factual findings supporting unfitness and remand is required. | Court: Oral on-the-record finding adopting the State’s factual basis and the admission satisfied section 2-21(1). |
| Knowing and voluntary nature of admission | The court properly admonished Durbin and ensured she understood the allegation; counsel represented her; warnings had been given throughout the case. | The admission was not knowing/voluntary because she lacked an adequate factual basis explaining how failure-to-make-progress related to her parenting. | Court: Admission was knowing and voluntary; factual basis was adequate and Durbin acknowledged understanding. |
| Best-interest determination | Evidence showed Durbin minimized risk from a sex offender, was dishonest, and failed services; children were thriving with grandmother who sought adoption — termination served children’s needs. | Durbin argued the children preferred her, had ties to Illinois, grandmother’s age and plans to move create instability, and the court should favor reunification. | Court: Best-interest finding was not against manifest weight of the evidence; termination affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Rathbone, 345 Ill. App. 3d 305 (appellate standard for forfeiture and preservation)
- Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill. App. 3d 941 (forfeiture is a party-based limitation)
- People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319 (factual-basis standard for guilty pleas)
- People v. Williams, 299 Ill. App. 3d 791 (trial court may ask prosecutor to describe evidence to establish factual basis)
- People v. White, 2011 IL 109616 (plea/admission removes prosecution’s burden; factual-basis comparison)
- In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356 (due process requires factual basis for admission of parental unfitness)
- In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364 (statutory requirement for court to state factual basis; oral findings may suffice)
- In re C.J., 2011 IL App (4th) 110476 (standard of review for sufficiency of factual basis on admission)
- In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063 (best-interest burden and standard of review)
- In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052 (enumeration of best-interest factors)