94 A.3d 760
D.C.2014Background
- Shortly after 10:00 a.m., homeowner Pickett saw juveniles break into a neighboring home; he called 911 and described the youths.
- Police located a group of four juveniles in an apartment building at 10:37 a.m.; D.M. matched part of the lookout (black jacket, tan pants) and was detained while others were released.
- Detective Howard interviewed Pickett, then drove Pickett from his location back to the apartment building for a show-up identification; the show-up occurred at 11:52 a.m. (about 75 minutes after the stop).
- At the suppression hearing the government offered minimal testimony about the timing and steps taken to contact Pickett and arrange the show-up; Howard did not explain when or how Pickett was contacted or how long Pickett took to return.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the police diligently pursued the investigation and the delay was reasonable; the appellate court reversed for insufficient factual proof that the delay was necessary or that officers acted diligently.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (D.M.) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 75-minute detention converted an investigatory stop into a de facto arrest | The 75-minute duration was per se or functionally unreasonable and transformed the stop into an arrest | The stop began with reasonable suspicion; duration alone is not dispositive and the circumstances justified the delay | No per se rule for >1 hour; but here the record lacked facts to show the delay was necessary or that police acted diligently, so suppression required |
| Whether the police unreasonably failed to use less-intrusive means to verify identity (e.g., releasing D.M. and arranging later ID) | Officers could have released D.M. (they had his name/school) and later identified him, so holding him was unnecessary and intrusive | Police reasonably chose a prompt show-up; courts should not second-guess reasonable investigative choices or require use of every conceivable lesser-intrusive alternative | Court rejected armchair second-guessing: police methods need only be reasonable; however, government failed to prove on this record that the chosen method and delay were reasonably necessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603 (D.C. 1996) (standard of review and treating suppression hearing facts in light most favorable to prevailing party)
- United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (Terry stop length must be no longer than necessary and courts must consider police diligence)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (scope of detention must be carefully tailored; least intrusive means consideration)
- United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (prolonged 90-minute seizure of luggage was unreasonable where police could have arranged dog earlier)
- Davis v. United States, 498 A.2d 242 (D.C. 1985) (brief identity questioning during suspect stop may be reasonable)
- Mayes v. United States, 653 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1995) (government bears burden to prove investigatory seizure constitutionally permissible)
- In re T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334 (D.C. 1999) (trial court must be apprised of sufficient facts to evaluate justification and scope of a seizure)
- Sanders v. United States, 751 A.2d 952 (D.C. 2000) (court must evaluate facts underlying police assertions; conclusory testimony is insufficient)