In Re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 773 F. Supp. 2d 351

Plaintiffs Ross and Wachsmuth bring a class action alleging Sherman Act violations by Amex stemming from an alleged FX Fee conspiracy and arbitration- clause conspiracy.
Plaintiffs allege Amex participated with networks/banks (Visa, MasterCard, Citi, Bank of America, First USA, Chase, Providian, Household, MBNA) in fixing foreign currency conversion fees and imposing arbitration clauses.
The action relates to the MDL proceeding In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, and Amex seeks summary judgment on all claims.
Key factual dispute centers on the May 25, 1999 meeting at Wilmer Cutler where FX Fee discussions occurred among industry counsel, including Amex representatives, with disputed scope of FX Fee discussions.
Evidence shows contemporaneous FX Fee increases or notices across several banks and issuers, some pre- and some post-dating the May 25 meeting, plus extensive inter-firm communications on FX Fee and disclosure issues.
The court denies Amex’s motion for summary judgment on both the price-fixing and arbitration-clause-related claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was an antitrust price-fixing conspiracy	Plaintiffs: parallel FX Fee increases plus plus factors show conspiracy	Amex: no express agreement; independent actions plausible	Disputed facts preclude summary judgment; jury may find conspiracy
Whether the FX Fee increases make economic sense as a conspiracy	Evidence shows coordinated timing and mutual expectations	Any increases could reflect independent responses to market factors	Court finds economic-sense analysis supports a trial-on-conspiracy view
Whether inter-firm communications support a price-fixing inference	Pre- and post-May 25 exchanges among Amex and banks, including discussions of disclosure and pricing	Communications were about disclosure concerns, not price terms; no agreement	Evidence capable of supporting a conspiracy; not summary-judgment to dismiss
Whether plaintiffs have antitrust standing to challenge arbitration clauses	injury to competition can be shown even without Amex cardholder status	Plaintiffs lack standing because they are not Amex cardholders seeking relief for their own injury	Court holds plaintiffs may have antitrust standing to challenge arbitration clauses

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Sony Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (antitrust, require reasonable inferences and economic sense for summary judgment)
Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1987) (plus factors needed for parallel conduct evidence)
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004) (information exchanges can support conspiracy; not sole basis)
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002) (plus factors and unity of purpose to infer conspiracy)
In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (evidence of exchanges must impact pricing decisions)
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (U.S. 1992) (economic sense standard for conspiracy context)
Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (antitrust injury and standing in arbitration-clause claims)