In re Crystal G.
200 A.3d 267
Me.2019Background
- Mother (Crystal G.) appealed termination of her parental rights to four children under 22 M.R.S. § 4055, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and errors in the court's findings and credibility rulings.
- Mother alleged trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not seeking the trial judge's recusal because the judge also presided over the domestic violence docket in which she had been involved.
- Mother also argued counsel should have moved for further findings after the court largely adopted the Department of Health and Human Services' proposed findings verbatim.
- She claimed some adopted findings lacked record support and the court improperly made an adverse credibility determination based on judicial notice of unrelated child-protection matters.
- The District Court denied relief; this appeal challenges (1) recusal, (2) lack of independent findings/further findings, and (3) a credibility determination allegedly based on judicial notice.
- The Law Court affirmed the District Court judgment in all respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to recuse the judge who also oversaw the domestic violence docket | Judge’s dual role created appearance of bias; counsel should have moved to recuse | Mere familiarity or prior related docket involvement does not require recusal absent proof judge could not be impartial | Counsel not ineffective; recusal not per se required and mother failed to show judge could not be impartial |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to move for further findings after court adopted Department’s proposed findings verbatim | Verbatim adoption indicates lack of independent judicial judgment; counsel should have sought further findings | Courts may consider proposed findings; key is whether judgment reflects independent judicial thought and credibility determinations | Counsel not ineffective; despite verbatim adoption, court made sufficient alterations and credibility findings showing independent judgment |
| Whether specific findings lacked record support such that counsel was ineffective for not challenging them | Certain detailed findings lacked full record support and thus counsel should have challenged them | Identified findings had some record support and weight/credibility are for the factfinder | No ineffective assistance: challenged findings had record support or were matters of weight for the trial court |
| Whether court erred in adverse credibility determination based on judicial notice of unrelated cases | Court relied on noticed unrelated child-protection matters to discredit mother’s witness | Court did not indicate reliance on those matters in its judgment and judgment did not list or discuss them | No error: record shows the court did not rely on those matters in its termination decision |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Atwood, 988 A.2d 981 (Me. 2010) (recusal is discretionary and prior related proceedings do not automatically require recusal)
- In re Nadeau, 178 A.3d 495 (Me. 2018) (rulings or impressions from prior proceedings are insufficient alone to require recusal)
- In re Zoey H., 167 A.3d 1260 (Me. 2017) (courts may use proposed findings, but judgments must reflect independent judicial thought)
- In re Marpheen C., 812 A.2d 972 (Me. 2002) (trial courts may utilize draft findings from parties; independent evaluation remains essential)
- In re Child of Kimberlee C., 194 A.3d 925 (Me. 2018) (prima facie showing required for ineffective assistance claims based on counsel’s omissions)
- In re Tyrel L., 172 A.3d 916 (Me. 2017) (procedural requirements for appellate review of ineffective assistance claims)
- In re Child of Kaysean M., 197 A.3d 525 (Me. 2018) (appellate review standard when evidence objections are raised only on appeal)
- In re Child of Troy C., 196 A.3d 452 (Me. 2018) (weight and credibility determinations are for the trial court)
- In re Child of Ronald W., 190 A.3d 1029 (Me. 2018) (factual errors in child-protection orders are harmless if unlikely to have affected the outcome)
