In re Creation of Park Dist. Within Chester Twp.
2017 Ohio 4031
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 1984 the Geauga County Probate Court created the Chester Township Park District and appointed three commissioners; the 1984 order established the entity but imposed no ongoing duties.
- R.C. Chapter 1545 permits park districts to obtain a purpose either by acquiring property (R.C. 1545.11) or by entering agreements with public authorities to assume control or cooperate over park lands (R.C. 1545.14); commissioners may adopt bylaws and seek limited taxation.
- Chester Township and the Park District executed arm’s-length agreements in 1985 and 1993 under R.C. 1545.14 defining the district’s role and limiting commissioners’ powers; township retained ownership/control rights and supplied funding after dedicated millage ended.
- In 2014 an anonymous review alleged financial misconduct; the probate court, invoking R.C. 1545.06 and R.C. 2101.06, appointed a master commissioner to investigate and produce a report. The probate court adopted the report (not filed in the record) and issued a Confirmation Order criticizing township actions and invalidating portions of the 1993 agreement.
- The probate court later ordered the township to pay 75% of master commissioner costs and enjoined enforcement of contract provisions that reserved control to the township; Trustees appealed and sought prohibition to the Ohio Supreme Court.
- The appellate court held the probate court’s jurisdiction under R.C. Chapter 1545 is narrow (appoint/remove commissioners, approve donations/sales/annexations, dissolve the district) and vacated the Confirmation and June 2016 orders because the court exceeded that statutory scope by voiding the contract and imposing costs on the township.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the probate court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce or modify the 1984 creation order or to broadly supervise the Park District | Probate court’s plenary power and R.C. 2101.24(C) allow enforcement of the creation order and protection of the district’s purposes | Chapter 1545 supplies the exclusive, limited jurisdiction; probate court lacks general supervisory power over park districts or unrelated political entities | Probate court’s jurisdiction is limited to enumerated powers in R.C. Chapter 1545; it exceeded jurisdiction by exercising broad supervisory/enforcement powers |
| Whether the probate court could appoint a master commissioner under R.C. 2101.06 to investigate all Park District operations and contractual relationships | Appointment under R.C. 2101.06 is proper because the matter (investigation/removal) was pending before the court | R.C. 2101.06 presupposes a matter properly before the court; appointment cannot expand the court’s statutory jurisdiction | Appointment was permissible insofar as it related to potential removal of commissioners, but not to investigate and resolve broader operational/contract issues beyond R.C. 1545 scope |
| Whether the probate court could void provisions of the 1993 R.C. 1545.14 agreement between the Park District and Township | Court may enjoin interference with the Park District’s purposes and thus invalidate conflicting contractual terms | The agreement was an arm’s-length contract authorized by R.C. 1545.14; probate court lacks jurisdiction to decide contract validity or enter declaratory relief in such disputes | Probate court lacked jurisdiction to sua sponte invalidate contractual provisions; contract disputes must be resolved in a court of competent jurisdiction |
| Whether the township may be charged the master commissioner’s costs for investigating the Park District | Costs are appropriate to make parties who interfered with the district bear investigative expenses | Township is a separate political entity outside the probate court’s continuing jurisdiction; costs improperly imposed on it | Imposition of master commissioner fees against the township was improper and beyond the probate court’s statutory authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343 (Ohio 1991) (continuing jurisdiction may be exercised to enforce permanent injunctive terms)
- Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Props. II, 143 Ohio St.3d 346 (Ohio 2015) (final judgments must expressly retain enforcement jurisdiction)
- In re Adams, 45 Ohio St.3d 219 (Ohio 1989) (statutory schemes limit continuing jurisdiction in family-law contexts)
- In re J.F., 121 Ohio St.3d 76 (Ohio 2009) (courts must have express statutory authority to retain continuing jurisdiction)
- State ex rel. Chester Twp. v. Grendell, 147 Ohio St.3d 366 (Ohio 2016) (probate-court jurisdiction over park districts is derived from R.C. Chapter 1545 and is limited)
- State ex rel. Estate of Hards v. Klammer, 110 Ohio St.3d 104 (Ohio 2006) (master commissioner appointment under R.C. 2101.06 functions like a magistrate and presupposes a matter pending before the court)
- State ex rel. McGinty v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, 142 Ohio St.3d 100 (Ohio 2015) (a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction cannot enter valid judgments)
- Marrek v. Cleveland Metroparks Bd. of Commrs., 9 Ohio St.3d 194 (Ohio 1984) (park districts are separate legal entities that can sue and be sued)