2020 IL App (4th) 190061
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background:
- In Nov. 2018 Dr. Aura Eberhardt (McFarland) petitioned under 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to Craig H.; Craig’s mother, Teresa H., held a statutory short-form health care power of attorney and refused consent.
- Craig moved to dismiss under section 2-619, arguing the agent’s refusal and the Powers of Attorney Law (including its supremacy clause) precluded the State from pursuing involuntary medication.
- At the § 2-107.1 hearing the psychiatrist testified Craig (diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder) lacked capacity, had escalating psychosis and aggression, had improved on antipsychotics in the past, and the benefits of proposed meds outweighed risks.
- The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, found Craig lacked capacity, granted the petition for involuntary medication (90‑day order), and shifted the burden to show the agent was incompetent to refuse.
- The order expired after 90 days; on appeal Craig argued mootness exceptions applied and that the Powers of Attorney Law barred the petition and the involuntary order.
- The appellate court held the mootness exceptions applied (capable‑of‑repetition and public interest) and affirmed: the Mental Health Code allows a § 2-107.1 petition even when a power of attorney exists, and the Powers of Attorney Law’s supremacy clause does not preclude such a petition.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness — should the court reach the merits? | State: order expired, appeal moot. | Craig: capable-of-repetition and public‑interest exceptions apply. | Court: exceptions apply; addresses merits. |
| Does existence of a health care power of attorney preclude a § 2-107.1 petition? | State: No; § 2-102(a‑5) and § 2-107.1 contemplate petitions even if an agent exists. | Craig: Agent’s refusal controls; petition must be dismissed. | Court: Existence of POA does not bar § 2-107.1 petition; petition may proceed under § 2-107.1(a‑5). |
| Does the Powers of Attorney Law’s supremacy clause prevent involuntary medication under the Mental Health Code? | State: Mental Health Code reflects parens patriae/penological interests; specific statute governs involuntary treatment. | Craig: Supremacy clause makes POA decisions control over inconsistent laws. | Court: Specific Mental Health Code provision governs involuntary treatment; supremacy clause does not preclude § 2-107.1 proceedings. |
| Was the denial of Craig’s § 2-619 motion and the burden allocation erroneous? | State: record shows lack of capacity; motion properly denied. | Craig: Motion should have been granted because agent refused and Powers of Attorney Law controls. | Court: Denial proper; court correctly construed statutes and affirmed involuntary‑medication order. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345 (2009) (mootness exceptions and standards)
- In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338 (2006) (capable‑of‑repetition and other mootness principles)
- In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482 (1998) (mootness exception analysis)
- DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49 (2006) (de novo review of statutory construction and § 2-619 motions)
- In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200 (1994) (parens patriae interest and Mental Health Code purpose regarding involuntary medication)
- Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (constitutional limits on involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to restore competency)
- Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402 (2005) (specific statutory provision controls over general statute)
- In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1 (1990) (operation of health care power vs. living will)
- In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33 (1989) (interaction of powers of attorney and living wills)