In re Conservatorship of Townsend
293 Mich. App. 182
Mich. Ct. App.2011Background
- Townsend’s son petitioned to appoint a conservator over Townsend’s estate due to alleged diminished capacity and risk of dissipation of assets.
- The petition contended Townsend had assets of $700,000–$750,000 after her husband’s death and property sales, but had about $200,000 remaining amid alleged gratuitous spending and debt.
- Townsend admitted giving financial help to family without interest, often accepting work in repayment, resulting in substantial credit card debt and late payments.
- Townsend’s physician testified she scored a perfect 30/30 on a mini-mental status exam and was deemed able to manage property.
- The probate court found Townsend would have her property wasted unless protected and concluded she was a “vulnerable adult,” justifying a conservator under MCL 700.5401(3)(a).
- Appellant challenged the finding, arguing Townsend was not within the listed conditions and that being a vulnerable adult is not a valid basis absent a similar condition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a conservator be appointed for reasons not listed in MCL 700.5401(3)(a)? | Townsend argues only eight listed conditions suffice; broader reasons are unsupported. | Appointees may rely on non-listed but similar conditions to protect property. | Conservators may be appointed for circumstances similar to the listed conditions. |
| Is Townsend a vulnerable adult under the SWA for appointment purposes? | Townsend argues SWA definitions require age-related or mental/physical impairment. | Townsend’s exploitation by family supports vulnerability under SWA concepts. | Townsend is not a SWA vulnerable adult; absence of impairment or age-related condition bars appointment. |
| Did the trial court properly define 'vulnerable adult' as a reason to appoint a conservator? | If enlarged interpretation is allowed, Townsend could qualify. | SWA-based definition shows Townsend lacks qualifying impairment. | The SWA definition is not satisfied; the court erred in appointing a conservator. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Bennett Estate, 255 Mich App 545 (2003) (clearly erroneous standard for probate findings)
- Apsey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120 (2007) (statutory interpretation de novo)
- Henry Ford Health Sys v Esurance Ins Co, 288 Mich App 593 (2010) (interpretation of 'for reasons such as' in statutory text)
- Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637 (2008) (list items require related meaning; context governs)
- Tevis v Amex Assurance Co, 283 Mich App 76 (2009) (statutory interpretation principles)
- Ameritech Publishing, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 281 Mich App 132 (2008) (deference to unambiguous statutory language)