In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Marandas, 270 P.3d 231

In 1998–1999, Marandas represented husband in a dissolution; court awarded an equalizing judgment of $24,134 against wife, lien on house; lien later modified/removed via stipulated order.
By 2000–2001, husband owed Marandas $24,826; Marandas filed and recorded an attorney’s lien against the equalizing judgment and house.
In 2001, a modification hearing occurred; the court signed an order releasing the lien, without notifying Marandas or his involvement, later affecting refinance/sale of the house.
In 2003–2004, Marandas opposed disclosure of a settlement with Chicago Title defendants; he sought to have his lien treated as first paid from settlement—arguing confidentiality limited discovery.
Settlement negotiations resulted in a $42,000 payment to Marandas, allocated first to his fees and then to the lien; Judge Boutin later questioned this allocation and the confidentiality, and ultimately Judge Herndon sanctioned Marandas for related conduct.
The Bar charged violations of RPC 8.4(a)(3), RPC 8.4(a)(4), and former DR 1-102(A)(3) (and related rules); the trial panel found violations but the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of clear and convincing proof; Marandas’ conduct was not sanctioned under the disciplinary rules.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Marandas violated RPC 8.4(a)(3) and former DR 1-102(A)(3) through misrepresentations about confidentiality.	Bar contends statements about confidentiality were knowing misrepresentations.	Marandas argues statements were plausible legal theories about confidentiality.	Not proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Whether Marandas violated RPC 8.4(a)(4) or former DR 1-102(A)(4) for conduct prejudicial to justice.	Bar claims delays and concealment prejudiced proceedings.	Marandas asserts plausible positions and no improper conduct.	Not proven; no improper conduct established.
Whether Marandas violated RPC 3.1 and former DR 7-102(A)(2) by frivolous/warranted positions.	Bar argues positions were frivolous/unwarranted.	Marandas asserted plausible legal positions.	Not proven; positions were plausible.
Whether the Bar can rely on inferential evidence of a “double recovery” to prove dishonesty.	Indicates intent to double-recover from non-settling defendants.	No clear, convincing proof of actual intent; no double recovery occurred.	Not proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Whether the Bar’s asserted conduct prejudiced the administration of justice independent of misrepresentations.	Alleges prejudice from litigation tactics and delayed disclosures.	Conduct did not impair justice; lawful litigation positions.	Not proven; no prejudicial conduct established.

In re Eadie, 333 Or. 42 (Or. 2001) (clarifies materiality and knowledge for misrepresentation)
In re Huffman, 331 Or. 209 (Or. 2000) (materiality standard for misrepresentation)
In re Claussen, 322 Or. 466 (Or. 1996) (plausible legal theory defenses can negate misrepresentation)
In re Kluge, 335 Or. 326 (Or. 2003) (focus on the effect of conduct on administration of justice)
In re Merkel, 341 Or. 142 (Or. 2006) (definition of ‘knowingly’ for disciplinary purposes)
In re Paulson, 341 Or. 13 (Or. 2006) (not every unprofessional act violates ethical rules; sanctions may be court-driven)
In re Gygi, 273 Or. 443 (Or. 1975) (collateral considerations in disciplinary actions)