in Re Commitment Stoney Raymond Fontenot
01-17-00207-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 5, 2017Background
- Stoney Raymond Fontenot, nearing the end of a 1989 sexual-assault sentence, was the subject of a State petition under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841 seeking civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP).
- A jury trial was held; the single jury question asked whether Fontenot was a sexually violent predator. The jury answered "yes," and the trial court entered an order for civil commitment and supervision upon release.
- At trial the State’s expert, Dr. Jason Dunham, testified about the SVP pretrial screening process (TDCJ multidisciplinary team, psychological evaluations, forwarding decisions) and about Fontenot’s diagnoses and high risk to reoffend.
- During voir dire the trial court and prosecutor repeatedly told the venire that the jury’s role was to decide whether Fontenot met statutory SVP criteria and that post‑verdict placement/treatment decisions would be made by the judge and the Civil Commitment Office; Fontenot did not object at trial to these statements or to Dr. Dunham’s testimony about the screening process.
- On appeal Fontenot argued (1) Dr. Dunham’s testimony about the screening process was fundamentally erroneous and prejudicial because it "stacked the deck," and (2) the trial court’s voir dire comments misled the jury about the gravity and consequences of a "yes" verdict, warranting reversal despite lack of trial objections.
- The First Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Fontenot failed to preserve either complaint and that the narrow civil-law doctrine of fundamental error did not apply to admit unobjected-to evidence about the SVP screening process or to excuse the lack of contemporaneous objections to the court’s voir dire comments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fontenot) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of expert testimony describing SVP pretrial screening process | Testimony was irrelevant and highly prejudicial; it "stacked the deck" and constituted fundamental error excusing failure to object | Testimony was proper background/context; standard preservation rules apply | Court: No fundamental-error exception; complaint forfeited because no timely trial objection; overruled |
| Trial court voir dire comments about jury role and post‑verdict consequences | Court misled venire into thinking jury only decided outpatient treatment (downplaying indefinite commitment), depriving Fontenot of fair trial; fundamental error | Court and State accurately explained statutory allocation (jury decides SVP finding; court/CCO handle placement/treatment); objection required to preserve | Court: No showing comments were incurable; no preservation; overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. 2003) (describing narrow, discredited civil fundamental-error doctrine and preservation policy)
- Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006) (defining fundamental error as those directly affecting public interest or showing lack of jurisdiction)
- Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001) (discussing preservation and when comments may be incurable)
- In re Commitment of Martinez, 98 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003) (holding SVP proceedings are civil and not transformed into criminal proceedings by procedural protections)
- In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (discussing voir dire comments, preservation, and curative instruction burden)
- Foster v. Kansas Dept. of Social & Rehabilitation Servs., 127 P.3d 277 (Kan. 2006) (Kansas Supreme Court reversed where prosecution referenced multi‑level pretrial screening as "stacking the deck")
- Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1982) (noting limits on fundamental-error doctrine)
- Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) (preservation promotes fairness; parties should timely raise trial complaints)