2021 IL 126176
Ill.2021Background:
- Warren C. Snapp Sr. had prior sex convictions (1973 indecent liberties; 1992 aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and was civilly committed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act after a 1997 proceeding.
- Snapp filed an application for recovery in 2010; a bench trial was held in 2018 after delay and waiver of a jury.
- A clinical psychologist diagnosed Snapp with pedophilic disorder, used Static-99R and Stable-2007 risk instruments, placed him in a “well above average” reoffense category, and concluded Snapp was "substantially probable to reoffend if not confined."
- The Will County circuit court denied recovery and found Snapp remained a sexually dangerous person in need of confinement.
- The appellate court held the circuit court erred by failing to make an explicit Masterson finding that Snapp was substantially probable to reoffend and remanded for a new hearing.
- The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding the 2013 statutory amendment incorporated the substantial-probability element into the definition of “sexually dangerous person,” eliminating the need for a separate Masterson announcement.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Snapp) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether courts must make a separate, explicit Masterson finding that a respondent is "substantially probable" to reoffend after the Act's 2013 amendment | The 2013 amendment added that "criminal propensities" means it is substantially probable the person will reoffend, so a separate Masterson finding is unnecessary | Masterson's explicit-finding requirement remains binding; failing to announce it is error | The amendment incorporated the substantial-probability element into the statutory definition; no separate Masterson finding is required |
| Remedy for failure to make an explicit Masterson finding at trial | Failure to make the explicit finding required remand for a full rehearing (per the appellate court) | If Masterson no longer applies post-amendment, no remand is required on that ground; alternative arguments may remain | Supreme Court reversed the remand; vacatur was unwarranted solely for lack of an explicit Masterson finding and remanded the case to the appellate court to consider Snapp's alternative arguments |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305 (2003) (held circuit courts must explicitly find the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend under the preamendment Act)
- People v. Bingham, 2014 IL 115964 (2014) (reaffirmed Masterson requirement based on preamendment statute)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (civil-commitment doctrine emphasizing dangerousness and lack of control)