In re Coley, 55 Cal. 4th 524

Willie Clifford Coley had a lengthy history of serious felonies prior to the latest offenses.
In 2001, Coley failed to register as a sex offender and failed to update his registration within five days of his birthday, leading to a 25-years-to-life Three Strikes sentence.
The trial court refused to strike any of Coley’s prior convictions and rejected his claim that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, while Carmony II later held that similar punishments for similar triggering conduct could be unconstitutional.
A split develops among appellate courts over whether the Three Strikes sentence for a minor triggering offense can be grossly disproportionate, prompting review by the California Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of California held that, although a Carmony II-type analysis is informative, the court may consider trial court findings about the triggering offense when assessing Eighth Amendment proportionality.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 25-to-life for failing to update registration violates the Eighth Amendment	Coley argues the triggering offense is minor and the punishment grossly disproportionate.	The state may punish recidivists harshly to deter future crime given Coley’s history.	Not unconstitutional; case distinguished from Carmony II.
Whether trial court findings on triggering offense may affect Eighth Amendment analysis	Apprendi and related cases limit reliance on court findings in sentencing for Eighth Amendment review.	Court findings about the triggering conduct are relevant to proportionality analysis.	Trial court findings may be considered; Apprendi does not preclude their use here.
Whether Carmony II controls or is distinguishable	Carmony II is controlling because triggering offense was a minor registration violation.	Coley’s circumstances are distinguishable; his deliberate noncompliance supports a harsher sentence.	Distinguishable; Nichols and Crosby guidance applied; Carmony II not controlling.
How Eighth Amendment proportionality standards apply to Three Strikes cases	Lengthy recidivist sentences for minor offenses violate proportionality under Ewing/Solem/Graham.	Legislature may impose harsh penalties to incapacitate recidivists; context matters.	Court adopts a case-specific proportionality approach; here the sentence not grossly disproportionate given history and conduct.

People v. Carmony, 127 Cal.App.4th 1066 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (trial court discretion and proportionality in Three Strikes for sex-registration offense)
Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2008) (failure-to-update as a regulatorily minor offense; proportionality concerns)
Nichols, 176 Cal.App.4th 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (upholds Three Strikes where triggering offense is serious enough to deter)
Crosby v. Schwartz, 678 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholds Three Strikes where triggering conduct impeded surveillance)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (U.S. 2003) (upholds 25-to-life under Three Strikes given recidivist history)
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1980) (recidivist punishment sustained for third felony; early framework for proportionality)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1983) (three-factor proportionality framework for recidivist sentencing)
Andrade v. Attorney General of State of California, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001) (gross disproportionality analysis in multimove recidivist cases)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (jury determination required for aggravating factors in punishment)
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (U.S. 2005) (Apprendi applies to guidelines; sentencing discretion with jury-determined ranges)