In re: Clinton Young
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9547
| 5th Cir. | 2015Background
- Clinton Lee Young was convicted in Texas of two capital murders (Douglas and Petrey) arising from November 24, 2001 events; he was sentenced to death and exhausted multiple state and federal habeas proceedings.
- Trial evidence included eyewitness testimony implicating Young, Young’s possession at arrest of a .22 pistol linked to casings at the scenes, and testimony that Page and others implicated Young; defense presented evidence suggesting Page may have fired the fatal shots.
- Young previously litigated Brady/Giglio claims about undisclosed plea offers or promises of leniency to prosecution witnesses (Page and Ray) in state habeas proceedings and in a prior federal habeas petition; state and district courts found no enforceable plea deals and rejected claims.
- In 2013–2014 Young obtained new statements from several inmates and witnesses (Stuteville, Elias Gomez, Tucker, Brook, Dano, Kemp, Hutchinson, Amanda Williams) alleging: (1) Page had an undisclosed plea offer; (2) prosecutors/agents induced or threatened some witnesses; and (3) three witnesses overheard Page admit culpability for Petrey’s murder.
- Young sought Fifth Circuit authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) premised on this new evidence; he also sought a stay of execution. The Fifth Circuit denied authorization and the stay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Young’s Brady claim about Page’s alleged plea offer is successive under § 2244(b)(1) | Young: new evidence materially alters prior Brady claim because the deal was an unconditional 30-year offer (not conditioned on polygraph) and thus not previously presented | Government: substantially the same claim was litigated before; the new allegation is a minor change and was effectively presented earlier | Court: Dismissed as successive under § 2244(b)(1); the new gloss on an earlier Brady claim is insufficient to avoid the bar |
| Whether the alleged undisclosed inducements/threats to witnesses and Page’s plea evidence satisfy AEDPA’s gateway for successive petitions (§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)) | Young: new witness statements show prosecution withheld impeachment evidence that would have undermined witnesses’ credibility and affected guilt determination | Government: even without these witnesses at guilt phase, abundant independent evidence would permit a reasonable jury to convict; some alleged inducements related only to punishment phase | Court: Denied — the new evidence would not, by clear and convincing proof, show no reasonable factfinder would have found Young guilty |
| Whether three recanted/incarcerated witnesses who later alleged Page admissions constitute newly discoverable evidence and satisfy statute of limitations (§ 2244(d)(1)(D)) | Young: Kemp and Hutchinson were intimidated and unavailable earlier; their post-2010 recantations are newly discoverable and timely | Government: argues earlier opportunities to elicit or cross-examine should have put Young on notice (statute may have run) | Court: Kemp and Hutchinson not time-barred (crediting potential intimidation); nonetheless the belated statements are unreliable and cumulative, and fail § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) because they would not clearly show innocence |
| Whether Amanda Williams’s statements are newly discoverable under § 2244(d)(1) | Young: Williams heard inculpatory comments by Page that would support alternate-suspect theory | Government: Williams’s testimony was discoverable earlier and Young gives no reason for delay | Court: Denied — Young failed to show due diligence; Williams’s evidence is untimely and would not satisfy the clear-and-convincing gateway |
Key Cases Cited
- Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 2001) (prima facie standard for authorization to file successive habeas applications)
- Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussion of threshold showing for successive petitions)
- Knox v. Johnson, 224 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2000) (a witness’s hope for leniency does not establish a binding plea agreement for Brady purposes)
- Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1998) (statute of limitations for newly discovered evidence runs from when petitioner knew or should have known the facts supporting the claim)
- Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussion of linkage required between new innocence evidence and alleged constitutional error under AEDPA)