In re Children of Kacee S.
2021 ME 36
| Me. | 2021Background
- DHHS filed child protection and then a termination petition against Kacee S. (mother) in 2019–2020; preliminary and jeopardy orders had been entered earlier and the children were placed in DHHS custody.
- Mother was served with the termination petition in hand but the service did not include the hearing date; the court later set the termination hearing and provided the date to mother’s trial counsel.
- At the September 16, 2020 termination hearing the mother was absent; her trial counsel arrived late, did not move to continue, did only minimal cross-examination, presented no defense evidence or closing argument, and did not ask the record be held open.
- The father initially sought a continuance but later consented to termination; the trial court found DHHS proved statutory unfitness criteria by clear and convincing evidence and terminated the mother’s parental rights.
- The mother timely appealed and filed Rule 60(b) motions: an initial, timely but affidavit‑deficient Rule 60(b) by interim counsel (denied), and a later, affidavit‑supported Rule 60(b) by appellate counsel (denied as untimely by the trial court).
- The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded exceptional circumstances excused the timing defect, found the mother made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance by both trial and interim counsel, vacated the denial of her second Rule 60(b) motion, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability/timeliness of ineffective‑assistance claim | Mother: Second Rule 60(b) should be considered despite timing because initial Rule 60(b) was timely but deficient and she promptly cured defects. | DHHS: Mother’s properly supported Rule 60(b) was untimely under In re M.P. and should be barred. | Court: Exceptional circumstances excused timing; mother’s claim is properly before the court. |
| Ineffective assistance at trial (performance) | Mother: Trial counsel failed to notify her of hearing, failed to advise re: voluntary consent option, failed to object or present evidence, and provided only minimal cross‑examination. | DHHS: Record supports court’s findings; counsel’s actions may reflect strategy and mother appeared at earlier hearings. | Court: Mother made a prima facie showing that trial counsel’s performance was manifestly unreasonable. |
| Prejudice from trial counsel (effect on outcome) | Mother: Counsel’s failings deprived her of meaningful opportunity to be heard and of the chance to consent and avoid an aggravating factor. | DHHS: Even with counsel’s conduct, the record supports the court’s findings on statutory criteria and best interests. | Court: Mother made a prima facie showing of prejudice—errors undermined confidence in the judgment and risked an aggravating factor. |
| Ineffective assistance in post‑judgment phase (interim counsel) | Mother: Interim counsel’s Rule 60(b) motion omitted the required affidavit, thwarting a hearing on ineffectiveness and denying process. | DHHS: Interim counsel’s filings were made but court correctly denied the deficient motion. | Court: Interim counsel’s omission constituted prima facie ineffective assistance and caused prejudice by preventing a merits hearing. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re M.P., 126 A.3d 718 (procedure for raising ineffectiveness claims and timing rule)
- In re Tyrel L., 172 A.3d 916 (affidavit requirement for Rule 60(b) ineffectiveness claims)
- In re Aliyah M., 144 A.3d 50 (ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal and affidavit limits)
- In re Children of Jeremy A., 187 A.3d 602 (Strickland standard applied in parental‑rights context)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (circumstances where prejudice may be presumed)
- Adoption by Jessica M., 239 A.3d 633 (due‑process protections and meaningful opportunity to be heard)
