In re Children of Jeremy A.
187 A.3d 602
| Me. | 2018Background
- Parents previously convicted for crimes against their older child Nathaniel (mother convicted of manslaughter; father convicted of assault). Ten years later they had twins who were placed with DHHS and then foster care shortly after birth.
- In 2014 the court found the twins to be in circumstances of jeopardy and ceased reunification due to aggravating factors based on the prior convictions; that jeopardy finding was affirmed on appeal (Evelyn I).
- DHHS petitioned to terminate parental rights in July 2014; after a 2015 termination hearing the court terminated both parents’ rights. The parents appealed and later filed a joint Rule 60(b) motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at both the jeopardy and termination hearings.
- A Rule 60(b) hearing in late 2016 developed expert testimony the parents had been prevented from presenting at the termination hearing; the court granted Rule 60(b) relief as to the jeopardy hearing but this was reversed on appeal in Evelyn II and remanded to reconsider the termination evidence under the correct legal standard.
- On remand the parents sought to reopen the termination record to (1) include the Rule 60(b) expert testimony and (2) present updated evidence regarding the children’s current circumstances; the court denied reopening, re-terminated parental rights, and denied the parents’ Rule 60(b) claims as to the termination hearing.
- The District Court relied on the parents’ criminal convictions, the parents’ persistent denial/lack of insight regarding Nathaniel’s death, the absence of feasible protective measures, and the children’s best interests in affirming termination; parents appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Parents' Argument | DHHS/Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion to reopen termination evidence | Parents sought to add expert testimony from Rule 60(b) hearing and updated evidence about the children’s circumstances | Remand limited evidentiary scope to exclude Rule 60(b) hearing evidence; parents failed to proffer updated evidence | Denial of reopening affirmed: court correctly excluded Rule 60(b) evidence and did not abuse discretion in refusing to reopen for lack of proffer |
| Rule 60(b) — ineffective assistance (mother) | Mother argued counsel’s failure to timely disclose forensic pathologist prejudiced termination outcome because alternative causes of Nathaniel’s death were plausible | Court found counsel’s failure deficient but new expert testimony was not persuasive enough to show prejudice given criminal conviction and opposing medical testimony | Denied: ineffective assistance found in disclosure but no prejudice; termination remains a just result |
| Rule 60(b) — ineffective assistance (father) | Father argued counsel was ineffective by not presenting the parents’ medical expert at termination | Counsel reasonably focused on showing father’s present fitness rather than relitigating settled criminal conduct; even if expert testimony had been presented, it would not have changed outcome | Denied: no deficient performance as to father; no prejudice shown |
| Best‑interests challenge | Parents contended changed circumstances and attachments favored reconsideration | Record showed children stable with experienced foster parents, parental denial of responsibility, and lack of protective conditions; competent evidence supported best‑interests finding | Affirmed: court’s best‑interests determination supported by clear and convincing evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- In re E.A., 114 A.3d 207 (Me. 2015) (affirming jeopardy order)
- In re Evelyn A., 169 A.3d 914 (Me. 2017) (clarifying scope of remand and limits on using Rule 60(b) hearing evidence in termination proceeding)
- In re Danielle S., 844 A.2d 1148 (Me. 2004) (standard for reopening evidence in termination proceedings)
- In re Alexandria C., 152 A.3d 617 (Me. 2016) (standards for proving ineffective assistance in child protection cases)
- Theriault v. State, 125 A.3d 1163 (Me. 2015) (defining reasonable‑probability standard for prejudice in ineffective assistance claims)
