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435 F.Supp.3d 845
N.D. Ill.
2020
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Background

  • Plaintiffs traded cash‑settled VIX options/futures that Cboe priced using an SOQ settlement calculation derived from the VIX formula; SOQ relied on thin, out‑of‑the‑money SPX options and used a two‑zero‑bid rule and a narrow pre‑market settlement window.
  • Plaintiffs allege anonymous traders manipulated SOQ (by "banging the close" and avoiding two consecutive zero bids), causing distorted settlements; an academic paper and whistleblower allegedly corroborated concentrated settlement‑window trading.
  • Plaintiffs claim Cboe knew (or was reckless in not knowing) about the manipulation, profited from higher fees, and failed to enforce rules meant to prevent manipulation.
  • Causes of action included securities fraud under §10(b)/Rule 10b‑5 and multiple Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) claims (failure to enforce, aiding/abetting, principal‑agent), plus negligence.
  • The court addressed Cboe’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint and dismissed all claims against Cboe with prejudice, primarily finding plaintiffs failed to plead scienter and adequate loss/causation for their fraud and CEA claims.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Securities‑fraud scienter (§10(b)) Cboe designed the VIX/SOQ, knew of vulnerabilities and red flags, had motive (fees/IPO), and thus acted recklessly or with intent. Cboe lacked actual knowledge; design decisions and profit motive are insufficient; allegations amount to aiding‑and‑abetting which §10(b) does not permit. Dismissed: plaintiffs failed to plead a "strong inference" of scienter; more plausible inference was negligence/profit motive, not intentional fraud.
Securities‑fraud loss causation Manipulation at settlement dates caused named plaintiffs to pay more/receive less; lasting‑impact artificiality harmed traders even off settlement days. Plaintiffs do not plead directionality or specific harm per transaction; cannot show manipulation caused their losses. Dismissed: loss causation inadequately pleaded—no specific showing that manipulation operated to each plaintiff’s detriment.
CEA failure‑to‑enforce / bad faith (§25) Cboe had nondiscretionary duties to prevent manipulation and negligently failed to enforce rules; observable patterns around SOQ were detectable. Any enforcement alternatives are speculative; plaintiffs cannot plausibly link Cboe’s inaction to their actual losses. Partial support on bad‑faith pleading standard (negligence suffices), but claim dismissed for lack of adequately pleaded actual damages and proximate causation.
CEA secondary liability (aiding/abetting, principal‑agent) Cboe entities knowingly enabled manipulation or were agents of one another, so secondary liability follows. Plaintiffs fail to allege knowledge + intent to further violations, any specific acts in furtherance, or a viable primary violation against a Cboe entity. Dismissed: aiding/abetting and principal‑agent claims insufficiently pleaded.

Key Cases Cited

  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading‑standard / factual plausibility)
  • Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading‑standard / plausibility)
  • Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (scienter: strong‑inference test)
  • Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (no private aiding‑and‑abetting liability under §10(b))
  • City of Providence v. Bats Glob. Markets, Inc., 878 F.3d 36 (exchange can be primary violator where it co‑participates/profits from scheme)
  • Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (loss causation requirement in securities fraud)
  • China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800 (statute of repose concept)
  • ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (elements for market‑manipulation claims)
  • Harry v. Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc., 889 F.3d 104 (actual‑damages standard under CEA)
  • In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 390 F. Supp. 3d 432 (exchange liability where exchanges co‑developed/order types marketed to manipulators)
  • Wigod v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 981 F.2d 1510 (proximate causation and exchange liability analysis)
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Case Details

Case Name: In Re: Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index Manipulation Antitrust Litigation
Court Name: District Court, N.D. Illinois
Date Published: Jan 27, 2020
Citations: 435 F.Supp.3d 845; 1:18-cv-04171
Docket Number: 1:18-cv-04171
Court Abbreviation: N.D. Ill.
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    In Re: Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index Manipulation Antitrust Litigation, 435 F.Supp.3d 845