in Re Chelsea L. Davis
14-1063
| Tex. App. | Feb 2, 2015Background
- Pro se plaintiff Chelsea L. Davis filed a Notice of Removal seeking to remove multiple Texas disciplinary matters and related state-court proceedings (including an In re Chelsea L. Davis matter and Board of Disciplinary Appeals dockets) to federal court (N.D. Tex.).
- Davis alleges denial of due process: sealed grievance proceedings, refusal of Texas Supreme Court to accept filings, a vexatious-litigant order, alleged wrongful arrest threats, and denial of access to records.
- Davis asserts federal-question and diversity jurisdiction (claims > $75,000), removal under the federal-officer statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)) because she is a registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office practitioner and claims federal defenses, and removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 for denial of civil-rights enforcement in state courts.
- She contends she has standing and an actual case or controversy (including a § 1983 claim alleging private actors coerced the Bar to act to deprive her rights) and seeks federal adjudication of disciplinary-related claims and alleged conspiracies to disbar/disable her.
- Davis relies on USPTO practitioner rules (37 C.F.R. pts and USPTO OED rules) to frame federal interests (duty of disclosure, conflicts rules) and contends those federal interests provide a colorable federal defense supporting removal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state disciplinary/grievance matters present a removable "civil action" giving federal jurisdiction | Davis: multiple state proceedings and related docket entries create a case or controversy removable to federal court; federal questions and >$75k in controversy | Defendants (implicit): state disciplinary actions are non‑removable administrative matters and/or not yet commenced as civil actions | Not resolved in this filing (Notice of Removal asserts removal; no court ruling in the document) |
| Whether § 1442(a) federal‑officer removal applies because Davis is a USPTO practitioner | Davis: as an OED‑registered practitioner (USPTO Reg. No. 63,791) she acts under federal authority, has federal duties (duty of disclosure), and thus can remove under § 1442(a) asserting colorable federal defenses | Defendants (implicit): disciplinary proceedings are state regulatory enforcement against an attorney and do not fall within § 1442(a) removal for federal officers | Not resolved in this filing |
| Whether § 1443 removal (civil‑rights removal) applies because Davis cannot enforce federal equal‑rights remedies in Texas courts | Davis: alleges she cannot obtain enforcement of federal rights (equal civil rights and § 1983 claims) in state courts and seeks removal under § 1443 | Defendants (implicit): § 1443’s narrow two‑part test is not met because alleged rights do not fall within the specific protections and there is no formal state law expression barring enforcement | Not resolved in this filing |
| Standing / justiciability: Are Davis’s claims concrete, ripe, and non‑moot? | Davis: alleges concrete injuries (threats of arrest, denial of record access, risk of disbarment, physical injuries) and asserts favorable relief would redress harms | Defendants (implicit): may argue injuries are speculative, disciplinary processes not yet pending or matured, or claims are premature | Not resolved in this filing |
Key Cases Cited
- State of La. v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1992) (§ 1442(a) removal should be construed liberally to protect federal officers performing federal duties)
- Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (U.S. 1969) (federal patent policy can affect public interest arguments and preemption contexts)
- Nieto v. Univ. of New Mexico, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D.N.M. 2010) (state-court dismissal may still leave a case or controversy while avenues for reconsideration or appellate review remain)
- Lipman v. Dickinson, 174 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (practitioner's duty of candor to the tribunal qualifies advocacy responsibilities)
- Texas v. Gulf Water Benefaction Co., 679 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1982) (articulating the two‑part test for removal under § 1443(1))