In Re :Charlesetta O'Neal
1:20-cv-04060-EK
| E.D.N.Y | Dec 15, 2021Background
- Debtor Charlesetta O’Neal Bey’s Chapter 13 case was dismissed by Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Strong after Bey failed to file a written opposition to the trustee’s motion to dismiss and for other reasons.
- Bey appealed the bankruptcy dismissal to the Eastern District of New York but did not pay the filing fee or submit an in forma pauperis (IFP) application.
- The district court (Judge Komitee) warned Bey to pay or file an IFP application and dismissed the appeal when she did neither.
- Bey sent a pro se letter construed as a motion to vacate (reconsideration under Rule 60(b)) and a motion to disqualify/recuse Judge Komitee, alleging defective service, lack of proof of debt/contract, and constitutional infirmities related to the filing-fee requirement.
- Bey also made broad, conclusory criminal accusations against the judge without factual support.
- The district court denied both the Rule 60(b) reconsideration motion and the recusal motion, held the fee/IFP requirement valid under Supreme Court precedent, and certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith (denying IFP for appeal).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bey) | Defendant's Argument (Komitee/Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether to reopen/dismissing judgment under Rule 60(b) | Bey argued the dismissal should be vacated for lack of ratification of commencement, no proof of contract/debt, improper service, and that filing-fee/IFP requirement denies due process | Court argued Bey offered no new, non-frivolous facts or exceptional circumstances to reopen the case; filing-fee/IFP requirements are constitutional | Denied — Rule 60(b) relief denied; filing-fee/IFP requirement upheld as constitutional |
| Whether the judge must be disqualified/recused | Bey alleged corruption, concealment of evidence, conspiracy to defraud, and other criminal behavior (largely conclusory) | Court argued Bey offered no factual basis showing bias or facts that an objective observer would view as creating doubt about impartiality; judicial rulings alone do not justify recusal | Denied — no appearance of bias or valid basis for disqualification |
| Fee / IFP for appeal; good-faith certification | Bey contended IFP requirement denies access to courts/due process | Court relied on Supreme Court precedent that filing fees for indigent appellants do not violate due process and found appeal not in good faith | Denied IFP for appeal; certified appeal would not be taken in good faith |
Key Cases Cited
- Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule 60(b) is extraordinary relief and requires exceptional circumstances)
- Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming narrow, exceptional-use view of Rule 60(b))
- Maldonado v. Local 803 I.B. of Tr. Health & Welfare Fund, [citation="490 F. App'x 405"] (2d Cir. 2013) (Rule 60(b) not to relitigate issues already decided)
- Zerman v. Jacobs, 751 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1984) (same principle regarding relitigation in Rule 60(b) context)
- Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upholding filing fees for indigent appellants against due process challenge)
- United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy filing-fee requirement does not violate due process)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (judicial rulings almost never constitute a basis for bias/partiality recusal)
- United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007) (recusal standard requires objective observer to doubt fairness)
- United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998) (recusal required where impartiality might reasonably be questioned)
- Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962) (standard for good-faith certification of appeals)