In Re CH
133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 573
Cal.2011Background
- C.H. is a 13-year-old ward originally charged with lewd and lascivious acts (Penal Code §288(a)) against his sister; he admitted the conduct and was placed on probation in 2006.
- Over three years, C.H. made little probation progress, with four probation violations admitted by him, leading to multiple residential placements.
- In 2009, after ongoing violations and little progress, the juvenile court committed C.H. to the DJF for a sex offender program, despite his offense not being listed in §707(b).
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting C.H.’s claim of ineligibility for DJF commitment because his offense was not listed in §707(b).
- The California Supreme Court granted review to determine whether §731(a)(4) and §733(c) authorize DJF commitment when the most recent petitioned offense is a sex offense under Penal Code §290.008(c) but not an offense listed in §707(b).
- The court analyzes statutory text, structure, and history to conclude DJF commitment requires (1) an offense described in §707(b) and (2) absence of ineligibility under §733(c).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §731(a)(4) require an offense under §707(b) and not be barred by §733(c)? | People argue DJF eligibility can extend to sex offenses under §290.008(c) as referenced in §733(c). | C.H. contends no §707(b) offense means ineligibility despite §733(c) exceptions. | Conjunctive requirement; §731(a)(4) requires §707(b) offense and §733(c) applicability; not eligible here. |
| How does §733(c) affect eligibility when most recent offense is not in §707(b) unless it is a §290.008(c) sex offense? | People assert §290.008(c) exceptions allow eligibility. | C.H. argues no §707(b) offense, so ineligible. | Most recent offense must be §707(b) or §290.008(c); §707(b) prerequisite remains essential. |
| Should the word 'and' in §731(a)(4) be read conjunctively or are there circumstances for a disjunctive reading? | N/A | N/A | Conjunctive reading required; 'and' cannot be read as 'or' without rendering §733(c) meaningless. |
| Do contemporaneous statutes/history imply a broader eligibility for juvenile sex offenders? | Attorney General argues related statutes show broader intent. | Court should not rely on history where text is clear. | Legislative history does not override plain meaning; no implication that sex offenses outside §707(b) are eligible. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Murphy, 25 Cal.4th 136 (Cal. 2001) (statutory interpretation priority; use plain meaning first)
- Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP, 42 Cal.4th 503 (Cal. 2007) (limit extrinsic aids when text is unambiguous)
- Klein v. United States of America, 50 Cal.4th 68 (Cal. 2010) (avoid rendering words superfluous; harmonize statutes)
- In re N.D., 167 Cal.App.4th 885 (Cal. App. 2008) (fiscal realignment; different contexts may have different policy choices)
- In re Carl N., 160 Cal.App.4th 423 (Cal. App. 2008) (recall provisions separate from initial commitment; different context)
- People v. Watson, 42 Cal.4th 820 (Cal. 2007) (statutory interpretation framework; context and framework)