629 S.W.3d 149
Tex.2021Background
- A traffic collision downed a CenterPoint power pole and energized a downed line; Good Samaritan Glenn Wood Higgins later contacted electricity through the ground, was severely burned, and died.
- Higgins’s estate and family sued CenterPoint in Harris County statutory probate court for wrongful death and survival, alleging common-law negligence and that CenterPoint used an improperly sized fuse that failed to de-energize the line quickly.
- CenterPoint filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) gives the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) exclusive jurisdiction over utilities’ rates, operations, and services, so plaintiffs must exhaust PUC remedies; the probate court denied the plea and stayed proceedings while CenterPoint sought mandamus.
- The Supreme Court of Texas considered whether (1) the probate court’s jurisdiction is exclusive and (2) whether the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying common-law duty and breach issues (including fuse-size selection).
- The Court held the PUC does not have exclusive jurisdiction because plaintiffs are not "affected persons" under PURA, PURA and PUC rules have not displaced the common-law standard of reasonable care as to fuse selection, and the PUC lacks authority to adjudicate private tort claims; the petition for writ of mandamus was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statutory probate court’s original jurisdiction is exclusive | Probate statutes grant exclusive jurisdiction over wrongful-death and survival claims to statutory probate courts | CenterPoint: probate courts are concurrent with district courts and must yield to exclusive agency jurisdiction when applicable | Held: Probate court has concurrent—not exclusive—jurisdiction; it does not bar PUC jurisdiction if PUC otherwise had exclusive jurisdiction |
| Whether plaintiffs are "affected persons" under PURA and thus must file complaints at the PUC | Plaintiffs: they are not "persons whose utility service or rates are affected," so they cannot initiate PUC complaints | CenterPoint: plaintiffs’ claims about fuse sizing concern utility operations/services and therefore make them affected persons | Held: Plaintiffs are not "affected persons" under PURA’s definition, so the PUC lacks express adjudicatory jurisdiction over their claims |
| Whether PURA’s regulatory scheme (or PUC rules) displaced common-law duty of reasonable care re fuse sizing | Plaintiffs: no PUC law, rule, or order governs fuse size; industry practice/common-law negligence governs | CenterPoint: PURA’s comprehensive scheme over "operations and services" and general safety statutes bring fuse selection within PUC exclusivity | Held: PURA has not displaced the common-law reasonable-care standard for fuse selection; PUC has not prospectively regulated fuse size and cannot retroactively adjudicate common-law torts |
| Whether PUC tariff provisions or procedural rules make PUC the proper forum to determine negligence | Plaintiffs: tariffs contain only general standards; PUC procedural rules cannot expand statutory jurisdiction | CenterPoint: tariff language and PUC rules demonstrate PUC authority to resolve these disputes | Held: Tariff contains only general "good utility practice" standard that does not supplant common law; PUC procedural rules cannot enlarge statutory "affected person" definition |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 2004) (presumption of district-court subject-matter jurisdiction and limits on administrative exclusivity)
- Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 546 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. 2018) (PURA can grant exclusive agency jurisdiction when statute clearly expresses that intent or scheme is pervasive)
- In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2007) (PUC exclusive jurisdiction where statute and regulatory scheme created administrative review mechanisms)
- Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002) (administrative bodies exercise only powers expressly conferred)
- Cash Am. Int’l, Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. 2000) (declining to read statutes as depriving citizens of common-law rights absent clear legislative expression)
- Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (distinguishing agency rulemaking (future conduct) from adjudication (past rights))
- N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (limitations on non-Article III adjudication; distinction between public rights and judicially reserved matters)