in Re Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, Llc.
19-0777
| Tex. | Jun 30, 2021Background
- Wrongful-death and survival suit: decedent was electrocuted after falling onto a power line knocked down in a vehicle accident; plaintiffs allege CenterPoint used a wrong-sized fuse when constructing the line.
- PURA vests the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) with "exclusive original jurisdiction over the rates, operations, and services of an electric utility."
- In Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy (Chaparral), this Court held that when a lawsuit raises issues within the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction (e.g., tariff interpretation or utility standards), plaintiffs must first present those issues to the PUC before litigating damages in court.
- The plurality declined to require PUC exhaustion here, reasoning plaintiffs are not CenterPoint customers (so not "affected persons") and the PUC has not plainly set a standard for fuse size.
- Chief Justice Hecht’s dissent argues the plurality misreads PURA and Chaparral: "affected person" includes the public and noncustomers; the PUC should decide the applicable standard for fuse selection before courts adjudicate negligence claims to preserve regulatory uniformity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Must plaintiffs exhaust PUC administrative remedies on standards governing fuse size before suing for negligence? | Higgins: No — plaintiffs are not required to apply to the PUC because they are not ratepayers and the PUC has not set a clear standard. | CenterPoint: Yes — fuse-size/line-protection design is within PUC’s exclusive original jurisdiction; Chaparral requires presenting such issues to the PUC first. | Plurality: No exhaustion required; plaintiffs may proceed in court. Dissent (Hecht): Chaparral requires PUC first determine the standard. |
| Does the statutory term "affected person" require being a utility customer/ratepayer to bring a PUC complaint? | Higgins: "Affected person" includes the public and those exposed to unsafe utility facilities; noncustomers can complain. | CenterPoint/Plurality: "Affected person" is limited to those whose service or rates are at issue (ratepayers), so plaintiffs lack standing to initiate a PUC complaint. | Plurality: Limit applies — plaintiffs are not "affected persons." Dissent: Statutory text and PUC rules show "service" and "affected person" include noncustomers. |
| Does Chaparral control (i.e., must the PUC resolve threshold regulatory issues before the courts)? | Higgins: Chaparral should not bar the tort suit because the PUC hasn’t provided a clear standard and courts can apply common-law negligence. | CenterPoint: Chaparral controls; PUC must resolve the standard of conduct for utility operations before litigation proceeds. | Plurality: Chaparral inapplicable here. Dissent: Chaparral controls; PUC must have first opportunity to decide. |
| Can courts apply the common-law standard of care without PUC input where utility operations are implicated? | Higgins: Common-law negligence governs; no displacement by PURA. | CenterPoint: PURA/tariff/regulatory regime may displace or require PUC determination of standards that affect operations. | Plurality: Courts may apply common-law standard here. Dissent: Section 38.001 and tariff provisions implicate PUC jurisdiction to determine how standards apply. |
Key Cases Cited
- Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 546 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. 2018) (requires presenting PUC-jurisdictional issues to the PUC before litigating related common-law claims).
- In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 2004) (describing PURA as creating a comprehensive regulatory scheme protecting the public interest).
- Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994) (noting jury awards can have regulatory effects akin to administrative regulation).
- Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002) (discussing interplay between statutory/regulatory schemes and judicial remedies).
- San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (federal precedent on preemption-like effects of regulatory domains and the need for administrative resolution of regulated issues).