In Re Carrington H.
2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49
| Tenn. | 2016Background
- DCS filed to terminate Vanessa G.’s parental rights to her son Carrington after a decade of involvement, alleging substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, persistence of conditions leading to removal, and mental incompetence.
- Mother had a long history of mental-health hospitalizations, substance issues, and prior juvenile-court findings (including earlier dependency/neglect findings involving sexually inappropriate conduct toward children). She had been without custody since 2005 and largely without visitation since 2007.
- At the December 2013 termination trial, DCS presented testimony from multiple mental-health and child-therapy experts; the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of the three statutory grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interests.
- Mother appealed represented by appointed counsel, who raised only two grounds (noncompliance and persistence) and did not challenge the trial court’s mental-incompetence finding; the Court of Appeals affirmed, treating the unchallenged ground as dispositive.
- Mother then claimed her appointed counsel was ineffective (at trial and on appeal) and sought to attack the termination judgment on that basis; she also argued the Court of Appeals should have reviewed all grounds even if not raised on appeal.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court (majority) held: (1) while parents are entitled to fundamentally fair procedures and Tennessee provides appointed counsel, due process does not require a separate collateral remedy in every case to attack termination judgments based on ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) appellate courts must review all grounds the trial court relied on and whether termination is in the child’s best interests, even if the parent fails to challenge some grounds on appeal. The Court affirmed termination on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether right to appointed counsel includes a right to challenge termination on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel via a post-appeal collateral procedure | Mother: statutory appointment implies right to effective assistance and a procedure (similar to post-conviction) to collaterally attack termination for counsel ineffectiveness | DCS: statutory appointment does not create automatic right to collaterally attack; Lassiter/Finley principles mean no blanket collateral remedy; existing safeguards suffice | No blanket constitutional/procedural right to a separate collateral attack for ineffective assistance; existing procedures and safeguards are sufficient; decline to adopt a new post-appeal remedy |
| Standard/process for ineffective-assistance claims in parental-termination cases | Mother: appellate court best placed to evaluate ineffectiveness on the record and should be given a time-limited post-judgment mechanism to raise the claim | DCS: if raised, should be presented before briefing on direct appeal or expedited on direct appeal; remand only when record insufficient | Court declined to adopt a uniform standard/procedure (e.g., Strickland remand structure) and refused to import criminal post-conviction model; left procedural design to other fora but emphasized existing safeguards |
| Whether Court of Appeals must review unchallenged grounds relied upon by trial court | Mother: Court of Appeals erred by relying on an unreviewed ground or by not reviewing all grounds | DCS & Court of Appeals: unchallenged ground is final and can be dispositive; no duty to review others | Held: Court of Appeals must review each ground the trial court relied upon and whether termination is in the child’s best interests, even if a parent does not challenge some grounds on appeal |
| Whether appointed counsel’s performance in this case denied Mother a fundamentally fair proceeding | Mother: counsel’s omissions (e.g., not filing answer, not conducting discovery, not calling witnesses) were ineffective and prejudicial | DCS: counsel did actively represent Mother; strategy (cross-examination, arguing DCS failed reasonable efforts) was reasonable; no prejudice shown | Held: review of record shows counsel provided active, reasonable representation; Mother was not denied a fundamentally fair proceeding; termination decision affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (heightened due-process protections and clear-and-convincing standard required before terminating parental rights)
- Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1981) (no automatic Sixth Amendment-style right to appointed counsel in termination cases; appointment determined by case-by-case Mathews/Lassiter balancing)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (three-factor due-process balancing test used in Lassiter)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective-assistance claims in criminal context referenced in comparative discussion)
- Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (U.S. 1982) (limits on using federal habeas corpus to collaterally attack state termination judgments)
- In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240 (Tenn. 2010) (trial-court findings requirement and appellate-review guidance in termination cases)
- In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010) (discussing heightened proof and appellate review standards in termination appeals)
- Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 674 (Tenn. 2010) (noting no constitutional right to effective assistance in post-conviction proceedings)