In re Camp Lejeune North Carolina Water Contamination Litigation
263 F. Supp. 3d 1318
N.D. Ga.2016Background
- Plaintiffs are current/former service members and family alleging personal injury and death from exposure to volatile organic compounds in Camp Lejeune drinking water; suits were consolidated in an MDL in the Northern District of Georgia.
- Plaintiffs sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence, failure to warn, and related state-law claims.
- The court prioritized threshold legal questions (CERCLA preemption of state repose; latent-disease exception) and stayed broad merits discovery, permitting limited discovery on Feres and the discretionary-function exception.
- The Eleventh Circuit (Bryant v. United States) held North Carolina’s 10-year statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16), applies and contains no latent-disease exception; the Supreme Court’s Waldburger decision foreclosed CERCLA preemption.
- The North Carolina legislature later amended the repose statute prospectively (post-Waldburger); the Eleventh Circuit held that amendment is not retroactive to revive extinguished claims.
- This district court: (1) follows Bryant as binding Eleventh Circuit precedent; (2) holds Plaintiffs’ claims barred by N.C. § 1‑52(16); (3) alternatively finds Feres bars in-service claims; and (4) finds the FTCA discretionary-function exception bars remaining claims, leading to dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CERCLA §9658 preempts N.C. § 1‑52(16) or whether § 1‑52(16) contains a latent‑disease exception | Plaintiffs argued CERCLA or a latent‑disease exception should prevent the North Carolina repose bar | Government argued CERCLA does not preempt and § 1‑52(16) contains no latent‑disease exception | Court bound by Waldburger and Bryant: CERCLA does not preempt, and § 1‑52(16) applies; latent‑disease exception rejected; claims barred by the 10‑year repose |
| Whether transferee MDL court must apply Fourth Circuit’s contrary view (Stahle) or remand/transfer to avoid Eleventh Circuit precedent | Plaintiffs asked reconsideration based on Stahle and sought remand/transfer to Eastern District of NC or to a court whose circuit applies Stahle | Government argued MDL transferee court must follow its circuit (Eleventh) and Lexecon bars self‑transfer or improper transfer/remand requests | Court held it must follow Eleventh Circuit precedent (Bryant); Lexecon prevents MDL court from unilaterally transferring back for forum shopping; remand/transfer denied |
| Whether FTCA discretionary‑function exception shields the Government from liability for decisions about water supply, testing, remediation, and warnings | Plaintiffs argued BUMED/base orders and statutes imposed mandatory, non‑discretionary duties (ministerial rules) removing discretion | Government argued policies and technical judgments left ample discretion; decisions implicated policy (readiness, resource allocation, public‑health tradeoffs) and thus are protected | Court found no specific mandatory federal rule dictated precise conduct for the contaminants at issue pre‑1985; policy judgment dominated and discretionary‑function exception applies, barring claims |
| Whether Feres doctrine bars claims of service members arising from Camp Lejeune exposure | Plaintiffs argued Feres shouldn't bar post‑discharge or non‑active periods and that failure‑to‑warn claims can be parsed by duty periods | Government argued exposure and injury occurred incident to service while on base; post‑discharge claims are often barred where duty originated in service | Court held Feres bars claims that accrued while plaintiffs were service members stationed at Camp Lejeune; post‑discharge duty‑to‑warn claims not resolved as to all plaintiffs but alternative discretionary‑function ruling disposes of them |
Key Cases Cited
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) (CERCLA § 9658 does not preempt state statute of repose)
- Bryant v. United States, 768 F.3d 1378 (11th Cir. 2014) (statute of repose § 1‑52(16) applies to disease claims; no latent‑disease exception)
- Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 2016) (Fourth Circuit disagrees with Bryant and anticipates North Carolina Supreme Court would reject application of § 1‑52(16) to disease claims)
- Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (FTCA claims by servicemembers for injuries incident to service are barred)
- Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (two‑part test for FTCA discretionary‑function exception)
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (discretionary‑function analysis framework)
- Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) (MDL transferee court cannot order transfer that frustrates panel’s remand duty)
- Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2015) (FTCA jurisdictional and discretionary‑function discussion)
- OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2002) (agency manuals stating objectives do not eliminate discretion for discretionary‑function analysis)