In re C.Z., 956 N.W.2d 113

Infant C.Z. was removed days after birth; father had a prior termination of rights to another child and paternity for C.Z. was later established.
Father engaged in mental-health, substance-abuse treatment, FSRP, and Early Access; he had periods of regular overnight care and a month-long home stay without reported concerns.
Father relapsed (positive meth/amphetamines early, later cocaine relapse), had one tampered/abnormal drug screen, drank alcohol after relapse, and violated a court order by attending bars; he admitted some dishonesty and poor judgment but also showed remorse and engagement with services.
DHS initially recommended termination after the relapse but later changed position and recommended returning C.Z. to the father; the foster parents, county attorney, and GAL sought termination and custody for the foster parents.
Juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights under Iowa Code §232.116(1)(g) and (h); both the father and the State (via the attorney general) appealed seeking reversal, while the county attorney, foster parents, and GAL sought affirmance.
The Iowa Supreme Court (majority) held (1) the county attorney may participate in the appeal when disagreeing with the attorney general under §232.114(3), and (2) the State failed to prove grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, so it reversed the termination.

Issue	County Attorney / Proponents of Termination (Argument)	Attorney General / DHS & Father (Argument)	Held
May a county attorney participate in an appeal from a termination order when the attorney general represents the State and disagrees?	§232.114(3) lets the county attorney continue to appear and present the county’s position in the proceeding, which includes appeal.	In re A.W. and general statutes give the attorney general exclusive appellate representation for the State; county attorneys lack appellate authority absent explicit grant.	County attorney authorized to participate on appeal; “proceeding” includes trial and appellate levels under §232.114(3).
Were grounds for termination under §232.116(1)(g) or (h) proven by clear and convincing evidence?	Substance abuse, dishonesty, prior termination, court-order violations justify termination and keeping C.Z. with foster parents.	Father had engaged with services, many professionals recommended return, DHS changed recommendation to return; evidence insufficient for termination.	Grounds not proven by clear and convincing evidence; reversal of termination and return to father under supervision appropriate.

In re A.W., 741 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 2007) (county attorneys lack appellate authority to represent State absent statutory authorization)
In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467 (Iowa 2018) (de novo review standard for termination proceedings)
In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 2016) (three-step framework for termination analysis)
State v. Pexa, 574 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1998) (use of “proceeding” can encompass continuous judicial review, including appeals)
Ellefson v. Centech Corp., 606 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 2000) (definition of “proceeding” as any application to a court for a remedial object)
Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842 (Iowa 2009) (appeal and remand decisions may be parts of a single action for statutory interpretation)