In Re: C.M.C., a minor, Appeal of C.L.C.
140 A.3d 699
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- Child born 2009; removed from maternal grandfather's care in August 2014 and adjudicated dependent; placed in foster care and later with paternal grandmother (PGM) in Alabama.
- BCCYF filed an involuntary termination petition (23 Pa.C.S. §2511) against both parents on July 31, 2015; hearing set for August 18, 2015.
- Father voluntarily relinquished parental rights at the hearing; Mother arrived late, consulted with counsel, and orally consented in court to terminate her parental rights the same day.
- On the record PGM agreed to allow telephone calls and mutually agreed visitation post-adoption; Mother later sought a written post-adoption contact (Act 101) agreement which PGM refused to sign.
- Trial court entered a decree that Mother’s rights were voluntarily relinquished under the Adoption Act (Subchapter A) and terminated; Mother appealed.
- Superior Court vacated and remanded, holding the procedures and protections of the Adoption Act for voluntary relinquishment were not followed and Mother did not knowingly and voluntarily waive rights to required pre-relinquishment processes.
Issues
| Issue | Mother’s Argument | BCCYF/Trial Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mother’s on-the-record oral consent at an involuntary-termination hearing constituted a valid voluntary relinquishment under Subchapter A of the Adoption Act | Mother contends the oral consent at the involuntary-termination hearing did not satisfy Subchapter A procedural requirements (written petition, 10-day waiting/notice, counseling) and thus is invalid | Trial court treated Mother’s in-court consent as a valid voluntary relinquishment and entered decree accordingly | Vacated: court held the statutory procedures for voluntary relinquishment were not followed; consent invalid |
| Whether Mother’s consent was knowing, voluntary, and unqualified given alleged conditioning on post-adoption contact | Mother asserts her consent was conditioned on a post-adoption contact agreement (Act 101) and thus not an unqualified, knowing relinquishment | Trial court found Mother’s colloquy showed understanding and lack of contingency | Vacated: Superior Court concluded that without a valid waiver of post-adoption contact rights, consent could not be found knowingly and voluntarily made |
| Whether BCCYF could proceed under involuntary-termination provisions instead of accepting immediate voluntary relinquishment | Mother argues BCCYF should have been required to prove statutory grounds under §2511 and the court should not have accepted a same-day voluntary relinquishment | BCCYF proceeded to accept Mother’s relinquishment at the hearing and the court relied on that | Remand: Court directed BCCYF to proceed on involuntary petition or Mother to file proper voluntary petition complying with Subchapter A |
| Whether failure to advise Mother of the 10-day waiting/filing requirement or to obtain a written waiver invalidates her consent | Mother argues she was not informed of or did not waive statutory waiting/notice and counseling protections | Trial court did not expressly find a written waiver or record advice about the ten-day rule | Held that failing to afford or document the statutory waiting/notice/counseling protection undermined voluntariness; reversal required |
Key Cases Cited
- In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010) (appellate deference to trial court fact findings in dependency/termination cases)
- In re S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012) (standards for abuse of discretion review in termination cases)
- In re A.M.B., 812 A.2d 659 (Pa. Super. 2002) (voluntary relinquishment procedures and strict scrutiny for termination)
- In re K.G.M., 845 A.2d 861 (Pa. Super. 2004) (requirement of strict compliance with statutory relinquishment procedures)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (due process and clear-and-convincing standard for termination of parental rights)
- In re Wolfe, 312 A.2d 793 (Pa. 1973) (purpose of voluntary relinquishment hearing: ensure intelligent, voluntary, deliberate consent)
- In re Singer, 326 A.2d 275 (Pa. 1974) (consent to termination must be clear and unequivocal)
- In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273 (Pa. Super. 2009) (petitioner bears burden by clear and convincing evidence on involuntary termination)