In RE C.J.C. v. the State of Texas, 603 S.W.3d 804

Background

Abigail (b. 2014) was made a joint managing conservatorship of her parents in an initial suit; a custom possession schedule divided time nearly equally.
Abigail’s mother filed to modify the order in Jan 2018; she died in July 2018 while the modification suit was pending.
Maternal grandfather (Jason) and maternal grandparents intervened seeking conservatorship/possession; Jason claimed standing as a nonparent who had exercised "actual care, control, and possession."
The trial court, over the father’s objection (and despite no evidence the father is unfit), entered temporary orders naming Jason a possessory conservator with regular possession and some overnight visits.
The father sought mandamus relief arguing Troxel’s fit-parent presumption forbids court-ordered access over a fit parent’s objection; the court of appeals denied relief and the Texas Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court held the fit-parent presumption applies in modification proceedings when a fit parent was named a managing conservator in the existing order, and it conditionally granted mandamus vacating the temporary orders.

Issues

Issue	Father’s Argument	Jason’s Argument	Held
Whether the constitutional/ common‑law fit‑parent presumption applies in a Chapter 156 modification when a parent is named managing conservator in the existing order	The fit‑parent presumption applies; a fit parent’s decision about access is presumptively in child’s best interest and cannot be overridden absent rebuttal	The statutory presumption in Chapter 153 does not apply to Chapter 156 modifications; V.L.K. and other Texas decisions limit the presumption in modifications	The Court held the fit‑parent presumption applies where a nonparent seeks conservatorship/possession over a fit parent who was named managing conservator in the original order
Whether Texas’ narrower nonparent‑standing statutes obviate Troxel’s presumption	Troxel’s presumption protects parental decisionmaking regardless of narrower standing classes	Texas statutes narrow who may sue, but do not eliminate the constitutional presumption once a fit parent objects	The Court held narrowing standing does not remove the constitutional presumption; courts must apply it when nonparents seek access over an objecting fit parent
Whether prior Texas modification cases (e.g., V.L.K., Taylor) preclude the presumption here	Father: those cases are distinguishable because they involved parents who had relinquished or were not named managing conservators	Jason: V.L.K. shows Chapter 156 does not import Chapter 153’s presumption	The Court distinguished those cases (parents had relinquished or nonparent was already custodian) and read them not to bar the presumption where a fit parent remains a managing conservator
Whether father waived the presumption by invoking the court in the original or modification proceedings	Father: invoking court to establish conservatorship does not waive fundamental parental right	Jason: father’s use of the court or proposed judgment amounts to waiver/ invited error	The Court held no waiver: a fit parent does not forfeit the presumption by seeking judicial relief to establish conservatorship or by participating in proceedings

Key Cases Cited

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality recognizing constitutional fit‑parent presumption against judicial override of a fit parent’s decisions)
In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2000) (modification context where parent had relinquished custody to a third party; statutory parental presumption not applied)
In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018) (upholding narrower Texas standing requirements for nonparents; did not decide merits of access)
Taylor v. Meek, 276 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1955) (noting parental presumption that raising by parents serves child’s best interest)
In re Mays‑Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (recognizing Troxel’s effect and prior Texas applications in mandamus matters)