In re Byers, 509 B.R. 577

Background

Chapter 13 bankruptcy case of debtor Frank M. Byers III; creditor/former spouse Patricia A. Byers filed a motion seeking recusal of the assigned bankruptcy judge, C. Kathryn Preston.
Byers alleged the judge had a conflict from prior employment with The Huntington National Bank and displayed personal bias against her.
The case was near conclusion: discharge entered and related closing steps largely completed; many of Byers’ motions were filed after discharge.
Byers relied on 28 U.S.C. § 144 and § 455; the court explained § 144 does not apply to bankruptcy judges and addressed § 455.
The judge denied factual assertions that she worked in Huntington’s commercial lending department, had any relationship with Byers or the debtor, or handled loans involving them.
The court concluded alleged connections were remote or unsupported and that adverse rulings and courtroom remarks do not meet the high standard for recusal.

Issues

Issue	Byers' Argument	Judge/Respondent's Argument	Held
Whether recusal is required under 28 U.S.C. § 144	§ 144 requires recusal because of alleged judge bias and Huntington ties	§ 144 applies only to district judges, not bankruptcy judges	Denied — § 144 inapplicable to bankruptcy judges
Whether prior employment with Huntington requires recusal under § 455(b)(2)	Judge previously represented Huntington interests and thus is disqualified because related parties have interests in Huntington	Judge’s Huntington role did not involve representing the parties in controversy; Huntington is not a party to the bankruptcy matters	Denied — § 455(b)(2) not implicated; no representation of parties in controversy
Whether judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a) (Extrajudicial-source bias)	Prior employment and alleged ties to debtor/HBI create an appearance of bias	No extrajudicial relationship with debtor; any connections are remote; judge had no interest in HBI since 2005	Denied — objective standard not met; no extrajudicial-source bias
Whether judicial conduct/rulings show pervasive bias making recusal necessary (Pervasive-bias/Liteky)	Adverse rulings, sanctions, and alleged disrespect show bias and make fair adjudication impossible	Judicial rulings, sanctions for discovery violations, and courtroom comments do not establish deep-seated favoritism or antagonism; Liteky sets a high bar	Denied — rulings and remarks insufficient; no deep-seated bias preventing fair judgment

Key Cases Cited

In re Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (judges should not recuse needlessly to avoid judge-shopping)
Ginger v. Cohn, 255 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1958) (historical treatment of bankruptcy referees and inapplicability of § 144)
Barna v. Haas (In re Haas), 292 B.R. 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003) (§ 144 does not apply to bankruptcy judges; § 455 governs)
Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1988) (recusal standard is objective; focus on appearance of bias)
Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2003) (extrajudicial-source requirement for § 455(a))
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (judicial rulings and ordinary courtroom remarks ordinarily do not establish disqualifying bias)
United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1990) (judge need not recuse based on a party’s subjective view)