In re Br. M. & Bo. M., 2021 IL 125969

Wendy M. had a 2013 neglect proceeding involving daughter Br., during which attorney Lea Drell served as guardian ad litem (GAL) for Br. and appeared at several hearings.
The 2013 proceedings ended with Wendy’s fitness restored in 2014; a later 2016 neglect petition led to wardship and DCFS custody of Br. and her half-brother Bo.
In 2018 Drell—now privately retained—represented Wendy in the State’s termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. Wendy did not raise any conflict issue at trial.
The trial court found Wendy unfit and, after a best-interests hearing, terminated her parental rights. Wendy appealed.
The appellate court reversed, holding a per se conflict existed because Drell had previously been Br.’s GAL. The State sought review.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court: it held no per se conflict existed under the narrow three‑situation rule and treated GAL service as not equivalent to association with the prosecution or a “victim.” Chief Justice Burke dissented.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Wendy forfeit the conflict claim by not raising it in trial court?	Forfeiture applies because Wendy hired Drell and raised conflict only on appeal.	Excuse forfeiture given parental liberty interest and mixed appellate precedent.	Court excused forfeiture and addressed the merits.
Does Drell’s prior role as GAL for Br. create a per se conflict when she later represented Wendy in termination proceedings?	No — per se conflicts are limited to three situations; a GAL is an arm of the court (not prosecution or victim) so no per se tie existed.	Yes — prior GAL access to case information and advocacy for the child creates a disabling per se conflict that prejudices representation.	No per se conflict: the Court held GAL service did not fall within the narrow, established per se categories.
Are per se conflict doctrines and ineffective‑assistance analysis cognizable in Juvenile Court Act termination proceedings?	Yes — the statutory right to counsel implies a right to effective, conflict‑free assistance; Strickland framework can guide analysis.	(Aligned) The right to effective assistance applies; per se conflicts should invalidate representation absent waiver.	Yes — the Court applied ineffective‑assistance/conflict principles but limited per se rule to the established three situations; actual‑conflict claims remain available.

In re S.G., 347 Ill. App. 3d 476 (Ill. App. Ct.) (appellate decision finding per se conflict where attorney previously served as GAL)
In re Darius G., 406 Ill. App. 3d 727 (Ill. App. Ct.) (appellate decision applying per se conflict to successive, noncontemporaneous representations)
People v. Coslet, 67 Ill. 2d 127 (Ill.) (origin of per se conflict doctrine in criminal context)
People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill.) (explaining per se conflict rationale and prejudice presumption)
People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134 (Ill.) (describing three narrow situations that give rise to per se conflicts)
People v. Green, 2020 IL 125005 (Ill.) (recent Illinois Supreme Court discussion reaffirming limits of per se conflict rule)