In re Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104

Decedent Donald W. Bosley died 10/9/2008; he left a 2003 will and had an earlier 1987 will; Kenneth Bosley challenged the 2003 will on undue influence and testamentary incapacity while David Bosley was executor (with Howard as executor under the 2003 will, later deceased).
Decedent’s assets included Maryland real estate, securities, and a Murray Gerber home; he lived for years on the farm and then with Howard in York County, Pennsylvania.
Kenneth contends Howard had substantial influence via the 2003 will and that David benefited under the will by virtue of being named a devisee/trustee-related figure; he also challenges the 2007 power of attorney (POA) Kenneth obtained from Decedent.
Trial court found Decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the 2003 will, rejected the collateral-benefits theory for Howard, voided the 2007 POA ab initio for lack of notice/due process, and noted Kenneth’s unclean hands but proceeded on merits.
On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: collateral-benefits doctrine did not apply; 2007 POA remanded for proper due-process handling; testamentary capacity upheld; and unclean hands handling deemed harmless.
Final posture: order affirmed in part and reversed in part; remand on the 2007 POA issue; jurisdiction relinquished.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Howard and David in a collateral-benefits relationship under the 2003 will?	Kenneth: collateral-benefits doctrine applies to Howard via David.	Estate: collateral-benefits doctrine not applicable; no independent basis for benefit.	No; collateral-benefits doctrine inapplicable; no substantial benefit to Howard.
Did the trial court err by not considering forensic-accounting and Marguerite’s testimony on Howard’s control?	Kenneth argues witnesses show unfettered control.	Court did not err; testimony not legally decisive for collateral-benefits.	Meritless; court properly weighed credibility and relevance.
Did Decedent have testamentary capacity when executing the 2003 will?	Kenneth contends lack of capacity supported by expert.	Trial court credited scrivener and treating physician; capacity shown.	Yes; Decedent possessed testamentary capacity at execution.
Was the 2007 POA void ab initio due to due-process deficiencies?	Kenneth: the issue not before court; due process violated by sua sponte ruling.	POA validity not properly before court; capacity and form issues.	Remanded; due-process error; proper procedures required; maintain status quo during remand.
Did the court err in applying unclean hands to Kenneth?	Kenneth: doctrine improper here and irrelevant to merits.	Court could consider but declined to bar relief; any error was harmless.	Harmless; unclean hands not determinative to outcome.

Estate of Reichel, 484 Pa. 610 (Pa. 1979) (standard for appellate review in will contests; three elements of undue influence; burden shifting)
Clark v. Clark, 461 Pa. 52 (Pa. 1975) (undue influence burden, presumption of validity, three elements)
Estate of Button, 459 Pa. 234 (Pa. 1974) (collateral-benefits discussion in undue-influence context)
Estate of Simpson, 595 A.2d 94 (Pa.Super. 1991) (collateral-benefits analysis in will contests; limitations)
Stout v. Stout, 746 A.2d 645 (Pa.Super. 2000) (collateral-benefits doctrine requires extensive control via executor/trustee)
Estate of LeVin, 419 Pa. Super. 89 (Pa.Super. 1992) (collateral-benefits; detailed criteria for substantial benefits via control)
Adams’ Estate, 220 Pa. 531 (Pa. 191/1908) (executor with control may yield collateral benefits)
Estate of Mampe, 932 A.2d 954 (Pa.Super. 2007) (testamentary capacity vs. weakened intellect; credibility of scrivener vs. medical expert)
Estate of Ziel, 359 A.2d 728 (Pa. 1976) (definition and standards for testamentary capacity)
Estate of Hastings, 387 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1978) (capacity vs. business ability; age-related infirmities not dispositive)
Aggas v. Munnell, 152 A.840 (Pa. 1930) (classic discussion of capacity and related infirmities)