299 A.3d 561
D.C.2023Background
- Kenneth L. Blackwell (D.C. Bar admittee 1994) was subject to a Maryland child-support consent order from 2007 requiring payments to the Maryland Office of Child Support Enforcement (MOCSE); the order was later registered and enforced in Virginia.
- By 2009–2016 various proceedings found or alleged substantial arrears (VDCSE/MOCSE records showed large arrears; Virginia court held him in contempt in 2009 and imposed a purge payment).
- Blackwell contended he made some payments directly to the child’s mother (Cinzia Allen) but provided little documentary proof; agencies had no records of payments through them and service/notice to Blackwell was imperfect.
- Disciplinary Counsel opened an investigation after Allen’s 2016 complaint; Blackwell answered a written question denying that he had failed to make court-ordered payments (he answered “No” to a follow-up phrased to elicit whether he had, non‑willfully, failed to make payments).
- In 2020 Disciplinary Counsel charged violations of D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of a tribunal order by failing to pay child support) and 8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement in a disciplinary matter); an Ad Hoc Hearing Committee and the Board found violations of both rules.
- The Board recommended a six‑month suspension with all but 60 days stayed in favor of three years’ probation with conditions requiring payment or modification, and the D.C. Court of Appeals adopted that sanction and the Board’s findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delay / due process (three‑year gap before filing charges) | Disciplinary Counsel’s delay prejudiced Blackwell by causing loss of evidence (visitation notebook) and warrants dismissal. | Delay did not cause actual prejudice sufficient for dismissal; Blackwell could have preserved/procured evidence earlier. | No dismissal; delay alone insufficient without actual prejudice; Blackwell failed to show substantial prejudice. |
| Applicability and violation of Rule 3.4(c) (child‑support nonpayment) | N/A (Blackwell conceded Rule 3.4(c) applies to personal child‑support orders but argued substantial compliance via direct payments). | Disciplinary Counsel: court order required payment through MOCSE; records show substantial nonpayment. | Court assumed Rule 3.4(c) applies and, given Blackwell’s concession and record evidence, found violation for noncompliance with court‑ordered payments. |
| Rule 8.1(a) (false statement to disciplinary counsel) | Blackwell: the written question was ambiguous; committee failed to make findings on his state of mind; his “No” answer is not proven knowingly false. | Disciplinary Counsel: question, read in context, asked if he had failed to make court‑ordered payments; Blackwell knew he had failed and therefore knowingly lied. | Court concluded Board reasonably found the question unambiguous in context and the Hearing Committee’s finding that Blackwell “dissembled” supports a knowing falsehood; Rule 8.1(a) violated. |
| Sanction and probation conditions (arrears payment, payment to VDCSE) | Blackwell: recommended sanction too harsh; conditions forcing payment to VDCSE unlawfully modify Maryland order and due‑process concerns about disputed arrears. | Board: six‑month suspension (all but 60 days stayed) plus three years’ probation with conditions tailored to ensure satisfaction or modification and monitoring. | Sanction adopted: six‑month suspension with all but 60 days stayed, three years probation, and conditions allowing modification requests and alternative proof of payments; within acceptable range. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Evans, 902 A.2d 56 (substantial‑evidence standard for reviewing board findings)
- In re Ekekwe‑Kauffman, 210 A.3d 775 (undue delay alone does not warrant dismissal; must show actual prejudice)
- In re Klayman, 282 A.3d 584 (delay in disciplinary prosecution and dismissal standard; public interest weighs against dismissal absent prejudice)
- In re Krame, 284 A.3d 745 (review of ultimate facts such as intent and reliance on hearing committee credibility findings)
- In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032 (factors guiding selection of disciplinary sanctions)
- In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366 (presumption in favor of Board’s recommended sanction)
- In re McClure, 144 A.3d 570 (Board recommendation adopted if within wide range of acceptable outcomes)
- In re Untalan, 174 A.3d 259 (analogous disciplinary outcome: six‑month suspension with all but 60 days stayed)