2018 UT App 157
Utah Ct. App.2018Background
- Father (V.T.B.) had sporadic contact with his two children since parents' 2013 divorce; he was intermittently incarcerated for drug-related offenses and never paid child support.
- Mother (J.P.B.) filed a private petition in March 2017 to terminate Father’s parental rights; the children had never been in state custody.
- The juvenile court found statutory grounds for termination (abandonment/neglect/token efforts) and concluded termination was in the children’s best interest and "strictly necessary," despite no pending adoption.
- Father appealed, arguing the statutory phrase "strictly necessary" either creates a separate third element or at least requires termination only when needed to free the children for adoption; he did not contest statutory grounds.
- The Court of Appeals reconsidered how "strictly necessary" fits into Utah’s long-standing two-part test (statutory grounds + best interest) and whether prior Appellate precedent that treated best-interest as following "almost automatically" from grounds should stand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How to interpret "strictly necessary" in Utah Code § 78A-6-507(1) | Mother: it should be analyzed as part of the best-interest inquiry | Father: it creates a separate third statutory element requiring a specific finding; GAL: it is prefatory and meaningless | Court: "strictly necessary" is substantive and should be considered within the best-interest analysis (child-centered, meaning termination only when absolutely essential) |
| Whether absence of a pending adoption precludes finding termination "strictly necessary" | Mother: adoption status is one factor but not dispositive | Father: termination cannot be "strictly necessary" without an adoption or plan to change placement | Held: Absence of adoption does not categorically preclude strict necessity; extreme parental misconduct may make termination strictly necessary regardless of adoption prospects |
| Whether courts may treat best-interest as "almost automatic" once statutory grounds exist | Mother relied on Appellate precedents saying best-interest follows almost automatically | Father argued against that doctrine | Held: Court disavowed Appellate line that merged best-interest into grounds; best-interest must be independently and thoroughly analyzed and remains petitioner’s burden by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether juvenile court properly applied law to facts and termination order should stand | Mother argued prior findings supported termination and strict necessity | Father urged vacatur based on misapplication of the test and improper treatment of "strictly necessary" | Held: Vacated and remanded for the juvenile court to reassess best-interest/strict-necessity analysis consistent with this opinion; appellate court did not direct a particular factual outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (constitutional protection of parental rights)
- In re T.E., 266 P.3d 739 (Utah 2011) (two-part test: statutory grounds and best interest; clear-and-convincing standard)
- In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) (termination requires finding of unfitness/grounds; best-interest alone insufficient)
- In re A.H., 716 P.2d 284 (Utah 1986) (termination is a drastic remedy for extreme cases)
- In re J.R.T., 750 P.2d 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (earlier Appellate discussion suggesting destroyed parent-child relationship often satisfies best-interest)