In re B.T.B., 472 P.3d 827

Background

Mother petitioned in 2017 to terminate Father’s parental rights to two children; Father had minimal contact, repeated incarcerations, and had not paid child support.
The juvenile court found statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence (abandonment, neglect, unfitness, token efforts) and held termination was in the children’s best interest and “strictly necessary.”
Father appealed, challenging the court’s interpretation of the Act’s 2012 “strictly necessary” language and arguing it created a separate, prerequisite element.
The Utah Court of Appeals rejected Father’s proposed third‑prong test, held “strictly necessary” is part of the best‑interest inquiry, and disavowed its prior “almost automatically” cases that treated grounds-as-sufficient.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, affirmed the court of appeals’ statutory interpretation, clarified that (1) the best‑interest finding remains a distinct requirement often evaluated under clear and convincing evidence, (2) “strictly necessary” is part of the best‑interest analysis (from the child’s point of view), and (3) remand was appropriate for reconsideration under the clarified standard.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mother/Petitioner)	Defendant's Argument (Father/Respondent)	Held
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disavowing its “almost automatically” line of cases	The court of appeals should not have disavowed those precedents; once statutory grounds are found, termination typically follows.	Those precedents improperly blurred grounds and best‑interest inquiries and shifted burdens onto respondents.	Court of Appeals did not err; the almost‑automatically line conflicted with the statute and was rightly disavowed.
Meaning/scope of “strictly necessary” in Utah Code § 78A‑6‑507	Implicitly supported termination once grounds exist; or the GAL worried it would impede permanence.	Argues it requires an independent, pre‑ground inquiry and is only met when adoption (or similar) is pending.	“Strictly necessary” is not a separate, standalone element; it is part of the best‑interest analysis and must be assessed from the child’s point of view (i.e., whether termination is necessary to promote the child’s welfare).
Whether the best‑interest finding requires clear and convincing evidence	The GAL argued the statute doesn’t explicitly make best interest a burdened element; best interest is a judicial determination based on established facts.	Father challenged how “strictly necessary” and burdens attach; both parties questioned the evidentiary standard’s scope.	Court recognized unresolved nuance but affirmed longstanding practice and precedent treating the best‑interest finding as subject to the clear and convincing standard (consistent with statutory text, case law, rules, and Santosky due‑process concerns).
Whether remand was required because the juvenile court applied an undeveloped standard	GAL: court of appeals should have affirmed because Father’s argument was limited; remand unnecessary.	Father: sought reversal based on statutory error.	Remand was appropriate—juvenile court must reapply the termination petition under the clarified test (assessing best interest and strict necessity on the record).

Key Cases Cited

Pulham v. Kirsling, 443 P.3d 1217 (Utah 2019) (standard of review on certiorari)
State ex rel. A.C.M., 221 P.3d 185 (Utah 2009) (recognizing two‑step termination framework: grounds then best interests)
State ex rel. T.E., 266 P.3d 739 (Utah 2011) (same two‑step description)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (due‑process requires at least clear and convincing evidence before state severs parental rights)
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) (best interest paramount and discussed clear and convincing standard)
In re J.R.T., 750 P.2d 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (earlier court‑of‑appeals decision introducing the ‘almost automatically’ language; disavowed here)
State in Interest of K.C., 362 P.3d 1248 (Utah 2015) (recognizing child’s strong interest in permanency)