376 N.C. 118
N.C.2020Background
- Child (pseudonym Beth) entered DHHS custody after being found unsupervised and the grandparents' home was deemed unsafe; adjudicated neglected and dependent in April 2017.
- Respondent father has a history of substance abuse, criminal convictions, intermittent prison terms, relapses, overdoses, and poor compliance with services.
- Respondent failed to complete required services (substance-abuse treatment, random drug screens, parenting evaluation/class), did not visit or financially support Beth, and lacked stable housing/employment; he was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing.
- DHHS filed to terminate parental rights in December 2018; termination hearing occurred March 11, 2019; trial court orally stated findings were made by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" and entered a written termination order April 24, 2019.
- The written order contained detailed findings but did not expressly recite the statutory "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard; respondent appealed on that ground.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DSS) | Defendant's Argument (Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) requires the trial court to affirmatively state the "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard in its written termination order | Announcement in open court suffices; the written order need not repeat the oral statement if record shows correct standard | Trial court committed reversible error by not stating the statutory standard in the written termination order | The court held § 7B-1109(f) requires the trial court to announce the standard, but that announcement may be made either orally at the termination hearing or in the written order; oral statement here satisfied the requirement and the termination was affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101 (establishes that grounds for termination must be proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence)
- In re Church, 136 N.C. App. 654 (Court of Appeals held trial court must affirmatively state the standard of proof in its order)
- Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Town of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 620 (statutory-construction principles: ascertain legislative intent from plain language)
- Duggins v. N.C. State Bd. of Cert’d Pub. Acct. Exmr’s, 294 N.C. 120 (ambiguous statutes construed to promote the object of the statute)
- Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550 (avoidance of surplusage in statutory interpretation)
- Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651 (legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute)
