In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260

B.H., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for two counts of second-degree child molestation (after this Court reversed first-degree findings for lack of penetration and remanded for lesser-included adjudications).
The incidents involved two eleven-year-old victims; B.H. was nearly fourteen at the time.
On remand, B.H. moved to waive or limit sex-offender registration under G.L. 1956 § 11-37.1-4(j), arguing the conduct was criminal only because of the victims’ ages and that he posed low risk per psychological evaluations.
The State argued B.H.’s conduct involved coercion, manipulation, and threats, making it criminal irrespective of victims’ ages; it also questioned the assessments’ reliance on B.H.’s account and noted lack of substantive treatment.
The Family Court found coercion and abuse of trust, concluded it had no discretion under § 11-37.1-4(j), required registration, and denied the waiver; B.H. appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial justice properly applied the statute and lacked discretion to waive registration given factual findings that the conduct was criminal apart from victims’ ages.

Issue	B.H.'s Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether § 11-37.1-4(j)’s phrase “conduct of the parties is criminal only because of the age of the victim” applied here, giving the court discretion to waive/limit juvenile registration	The statute applies because if victims were older (>14) the conduct would not be criminal; thus the court had discretion to limit registration	The conduct included coercion/manipulation, so it was criminal regardless of victim ages; no discretion to waive registration	Held: Statute interpreted narrowly — discretionary relief applies only when victim age is the sole reason the conduct is criminal; here coercive conduct made it criminal apart from age, so no discretion to waive registration
Whether the trial justice abused discretion in declining to exercise § 11-37.1-4(j) relief even if discretion existed	B.H. argued mitigating factors (compliance, evaluations indicating low risk) justified waiver	State argued assessments were unreliable and B.H. had not accepted responsibility or undergone treatment; victims were traumatized	Held: Court did not reach detailed standard for exercising discretion because it found no statutory discretion here; trial justice’s factual findings (coercion, lack of accountability) supported denial

In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016) (prior appeal resolving penetration element and directing lesser-included adjudications)
State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479 (R.I. 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Calise, 478 A.2d 198 (R.I. 1984) (court may not rewrite statutory definitions)
State v. Erminelli, 991 A.2d 1064 (R.I. 2010) (deference to trial-justice factual findings)
Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68 (R.I. 2011) (expressio unius maxim and statutory construction)