In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II
1 Cal. App. 5th 127
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Class action by California purchasers alleging manufacturers and dealer associations conspired to prevent lower-priced new cars made for Canada from being exported to the U.S., inflating U.S. prices (class period Jan. 1, 2001–Apr. 30, 2003).
- Plaintiffs allege meetings, calls, and trade‑association activity (notably a May 15, 2001 CADA meeting) produced a consensus among manufacturers to “keep cars in Canada,” plus tools like dealer chargebacks, blacklists, VIN tracking, warranty denials, allocation limits and dealer terminations to deter exports.
- Extensive coordinated discovery and parallel federal MDL litigation occurred; Judge Hornby (federal MDL) found sufficient evidence for a jury on conspiracy but granted summary judgment on impact grounds.
- At state court, after piecemeal summary judgment rulings, the trial court granted summary judgment for Ford U.S. and Ford Canada, excluding certain evidence (Millette deposition excerpts and CADA meeting minutes) on hearsay grounds.
- On appeal the Court of Appeal affirmed the grant as to Ford U.S. (no triable issue as to that entity) but reversed as to Ford Canada, holding that admissible evidence (including lay‑opinion testimony about the CADA meeting and other meeting/minutes evidence) could create a genuine issue of material fact on agreement to restrict exports.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Millette deposition testimony (statements about May 15, 2001 CADA meeting) | Millette, a percipient witness, may testify to his perception/opinion that there was consensus; not hearsay and admissible as lay opinion (Evid. Code §800) | Statements recounting others’ remarks are hearsay and inadmissible | Trial court erred to treat that testimony as hearsay; it was admissible as a lay opinion and exclusion was prejudicial as to Ford Canada |
| Admissibility of CADA meeting minutes | Minutes are adoptive admissions (defense counsel at Ford Canada reviewed/revised and approved them) and thus admissible | Minutes are hearsay and multiple‑hearsay; exclusion proper | Minutes constituted adoptive admissions against Ford Canada and were erroneously excluded (court did not rely on exclusion for reversal) |
| Sufficiency of evidence to show conspiracy by Ford U.S. | Meetings, internal agendas, emails, and industry coordination show Ford U.S. participated in scheme to restrain exports | Evidence shows only unilateral actions, internal problem‑solving, and lawful information exchange; no agreement with competitors; parent/subsidiary unity prevents conspiracy between them | Affirmed for Ford U.S.: evidence insufficient to raise triable issue that Ford U.S. joined an unlawful agreement |
| Sufficiency of evidence to show conspiracy by Ford Canada | Meeting evidence (CADA and others), Millette testimony, parallel stepped‑up enforcement, information sharing, economic expert showing unilateral enforcement would be unprofitable — together tend to exclude independent action | Evidence shows lawful trade‑association information exchange, independent business reasons, and lack of adopted industry‑wide plan; trial court found plaintiffs’ proof speculative | Reversed for Ford Canada: viewed as a whole, admissible evidence could permit a reasonable juror to find an unlawful agreement more likely than not (summary judgment improper) |
Key Cases Cited
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826 (Cal. 2001) (summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy requires plaintiff to present evidence that permits a trier of fact to find agreement more likely than not and to present evidence that tends to exclude independent action)
- Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (U.S. 1984) (parent and wholly owned subsidiary are a single enterprise and cannot conspire under §1)
- General Motors Corp. v. United States, 384 U.S. 127 (U.S. 1966) (agreement may be inferred from meetings and concerted action; explicit formal agreement not required)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (ambiguous evidence that is as consistent with lawful competition as with conspiracy cannot survive summary judgment)
- Monsanto Co. v. Spray‑Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (U.S. 1984) (proof of conscious commitment to a common scheme may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence)
- Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (U.S. 1962) (courts should view conspiracy proof as a whole rather than dismembering evidence)