In Re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI)
822 F.3d 125
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Peggy Hassell sued Budd and Resco on behalf of her deceased husband, alleging asbestos exposure from steam-pipe insulation on passenger railcars he maintained while employed by a railroad (1945–mid-1970s); husband died during litigation.
- Claims were state-law products-liability/failure-to-warn causes of action removed to federal court and consolidated in multidistrict litigation.
- Defendants moved to dismiss arguing preemption by the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) and related federal railroad safety statutes; the District Court granted dismissal after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kurns.
- The District Court concluded the insulated pipes were “parts and appurtenances” of locomotives (relying on Lunsford) and thus Hassell’s state-law claims were preempted under the LIA.
- On appeal the Third Circuit held the District Court procedurally erred by relying on facts outside the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (and improperly converting to summary judgment without adequate notice or satisfying Rule 56 burdens), and that genuine factual disputes existed about whether the pipes were connected to locomotives or to separate ‘‘power cars.’’
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hassell’s state-law claims are preempted by the LIA (field preemption) | Hassell: claims target railcar equipment not directed at locomotive equipment and thus not within LIA’s preempted field | Budd/Resco: insulated steam pipes were locomotive "parts and appurtenances" (an interconnected system) so LIA preempts state-law claims | Court: remanded — District Court erred procedurally; preemption question not resolved on current record because defendants failed to carry summary-judgment burden and factual disputes exist |
| Proper procedural vehicle and standard — Rule 12(b)(6) vs. Rule 56 | Hassell: dismissal under 12(b)(6) improper because preemption is an affirmative defense requiring factual proof; extrinsic facts were considered | Defendants: alternatively styled motion as summary judgment and relied on record evidence/arguments | Court: District Court improperly considered extrinsic evidence on a 12(b)(6) motion; if treated as summary judgment defendants failed to show no genuine dispute of material fact |
| Whether Lunsford’s "integral and essential" formulation controls scope of "parts and appurtenances" for LIA preemption | Hassell: factual record does not show railcar pipes are integral to locomotives; Lunsford not dispositive here | Budd: Lunsford supports treating interconnected systems as locomotive appurtenances | Court: declined to decide the correctness of applying Lunsford to LIA preemption here; remanded without resolving that legal question |
| Sufficiency of record to grant summary judgment on preemption | Hassell: presented affidavit evidence (power cars) creating a genuine dispute | Budd/Resco: pointed to arguments/filings asserting interconnected system | Held: defendants did not satisfy summary-judgment burden; Hassell’s affidavit raised triable issue, so summary judgment inappropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (Congress occupied field of regulating locomotive equipment via LIA as amended)
- Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (LIA preempts state-law claims directed at locomotive equipment; field defined by physical elements regulated)
- Southern Ry. Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 399 (1936) (definition of "parts and appurtenances" as integral or essential parts of a completed locomotive)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary-judgment standard; credibility and inference-drawing are jury functions)