In Re Arcelormittal Vinton, Inc.
2011 WL 32430
Tex. App.—Waco2011Background
- Relator ArcelorMittal Vinton, Inc. seeks mandamus to compel the trial court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in an age-discrimination suit filed by Sandovol.
- Sandovol, a long-time employee, was laid off in June 2004 when the ball mill department closed; six employees were laid off, and only one returned when reopened in December 2004.
- Sandovol claimed discrimination for not being recalled between December 2004 and January 2005; Border Steel produced evidence showing another employee re-hired January 5, 2005.
- Sandovol filed a Texas Workforce Commission complaint February 28, 2006; the commission issued a right-to-file suit, and he filed his petition August 22, 2006.
- Border Steel moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing Sandovol filed his administrative complaint after the 180-day period required by Tex. Lab. Code § 21.202(a); the trial court denied the plea.
- The court of appeals granted mandamus relief, holding the 180-day period expired July 5, 2005 and thus the trial court lacked jurisdiction; it directed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Sandovol’s claim arise untimely under §21.202(a)? | Sandovol timely filed within 180 days of discrimination. | Sandovol failed to file by July 5, 2005; timely filing required. | Yes; failure to timely file divests jurisdiction. |
| Is mandamus an appropriate remedy to correct a jurisdictional error in this context? | Relator seeks immediate dismissal rather than waiting on post-judgment appeal. | Mandamus is not ordinarily appropriate; appeal could remedy. | Mandamus relief is appropriate to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Whether the limitations period accrues at the time of the discriminatory act or when consequences are realized. | Discrimination occurred when not recalled, triggering the 180-day clock. | Limitations begins when the act occurs and is known; the delay misstates accrual. | Accrual occurs at the time of the discriminatory act; here the time ran by January 2005. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (mandamus proper where there is clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal)
- In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2005) (abuse of discretion standard in mandamus review)
- In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. 2005) (mandamus relief when no adequate remedy by appeal)
- Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) (duty to plead jurisdictional facts; review of jurisdiction)
- Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co., 121 S.W.3d 78 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003) (jurisdictional pleading and timeliness under §21.202)
- Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. 1996) (timeliness and exhaustion of administrative remedies)
- Ricks, Delaware State College v., 449 U.S. 250 (U.S. 1981) (focus on time of discriminatory acts for accrual)
- Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1996) (statutory accrual principles for discrimination actions)
- City of El Paso v. Maddox, 276 S.W.3d 66 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008) (jurisdictional review and de novo standard)
