939 F.3d 710
6th Cir.2019Background
- ALJ (Saudi corporation) contracted with FedEx International (a FedEx Corp. subsidiary) under two agreements that provided for arbitration: one in Dubai (DIFC‑LCIA) and one in Saudi Arabia.
- ALJ alleges FedEx Corp. (U.S. parent) participated in negotiations and concealed a material acquisition, and seeks documents and a corporate deposition from FedEx Corp. for use in the DIFC‑LCIA arbitration.
- ALJ filed a discovery application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) in the Western District of Tennessee; the district court denied relief, ruling § 1782(a)’s phrase “foreign or international tribunal” did not include the two private arbitrations.
- The Saudi arbitration was later dismissed, rendering § 1782 claims tied to that proceeding moot.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the DIFC‑LCIA arbitration, holding that § 1782(a) covers private commercial arbitral panels like the DIFC‑LCIA and remanded for the district court to apply the Intel discretionary factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “foreign or international tribunal” in § 1782(a) includes private commercial arbitration | ALJ: Yes; the ordinary meaning of “tribunal” and historical usage include private arbitral panels | FedEx: No; § 1782(a) should be limited to governmental or state‑sponsored tribunals | Held: Court adopts the ordinary, broad meaning of “tribunal” to include private, contracted‑for commercial arbitral panels (DIFC‑LCIA qualifies) |
| Whether the Saudi arbitration portion of the appeal is justiciable (mootness) | ALJ: Court should vacate district court denial as to the Saudi arbitration to avoid preclusion if the dismissal is reversed | FedEx: Saudi arbitration is dismissed and thus irrelevant/moot | Held: Saudi arbitration issues are moot; reversal on the DIFC‑LCIA issue suffices and the district court judgment will not preclude future filings |
| Whether Intel limits § 1782(a) to state‑sponsored or governmental proceedings | ALJ: Intel supports inclusion of non‑judicial tribunals and administrative/quasi‑judicial bodies; private arbitration fits | FedEx: Intel’s reference to tribunal “nature” implies state‑sponsored bodies only | Held: Intel does not impose a state‑sponsored limitation; it confirms § 1782 applies to non‑judicial tribunals and supplies discretionary factors for district courts |
| Whether ALJ is entitled to the requested § 1782(a) discovery now | ALJ: District court should have granted the requested subpoenas/depositions | FedEx: Discovery should be denied or limited under Intel factors and policy concerns | Held: Remanded — Sixth Circuit declines to apply Intel factors in the first instance; district court must assess the four Intel discretionary factors and tailor relief if any |
Key Cases Cited
- Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (interprets § 1782 scope to include non‑judicial tribunals and sets four discretionary factors for district courts)
- National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (held § 1782 does not clearly include private arbitration; relied on legislative history)
- Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999) (similarly concluded § 1782 should be limited to governmental/intergovernmental tribunals)
- Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler‑Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (refers to private international arbitral bodies as “international arbitral tribunal”)
- Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (discusses arbitration panels as tribunals)
- Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (addresses judicial review of arbitral awards)