In Re: Applicants for Academy of Business and Entrepreneurship Charter School
In Re: Applicants for Academy of Business and Entrepreneurship Charter School - 221 and 1033 C.D. 2016
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Mar 21, 2017Background
- ABECS submitted a charter application to the School District of Lancaster; the district denied it and ABECS sought certification of a petition (with 2,185 signatures) to appeal to the State Charter Appeal Board (CAB).
- Pennsylvania Charter School Law requires petitioners to gather either 1,000 resident signatures or 2% of district residents and to file the petition in the county court of common pleas for a sufficiency hearing.
- The School District challenged many signatures; after a three-day hearing common pleas (Dec. 18, 2015) found 1,066 valid signatures but struck 535 collected by one circulator (Felipe) for lack of residency and struck 262 signatures where dates were entered by someone other than the signer.
- The School District filed post-trial motions; this Court later authorized the trial court to resolve post-trial motions. On reconsideration (June 17, 2016), common pleas invalidated additional signatures (total 766 for dates entered by others) and reaffirmed striking Felipe’s 535, leaving only 580 valid signatures.
- ABECS appealed the 2016 order; the Commonwealth Court affirmed the 2016 order, held post-trial motions were impermissible in petition practice (but treated them as reconsideration authorized by the appellate court), and found the trial court correctly invalidated signatures for pre-entered dates and for Felipe’s nonresidency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s 2015 order finding the petition sufficient was a final, appealable order | ABECS: 2015 order not final because it simply forwarded matter to CAB; parties not put fully out of court | School Dist.: 2015 order final—common pleas’ sufficiency determination is separate and appealable | Court: 2015 order was final and appealable |
| Whether post-trial motions were permitted in the petition proceeding | ABECS: proceedings are governed by petition practice; post-trial motions not allowed | School Dist.: There was a trial with evidence, so post-trial motions were appropriate | Court: Statute frames the process as a ‘‘petition’’; petition practice applies and post-trial motions are not permitted (but appellate court authorized reconsideration) |
| Whether signatures where the date column was entered by someone other than the signer are invalid | ABECS: statute doesn’t require signer to personally write the date; striking them contradicts statute’s purpose | School Dist.: Statute’s active phrasing requires each signer to include the date; someone else entering the date invalidates signature | Court: The statute’s language ("each person…shall include…date") is mandatory; signatures with dates entered by others were properly invalidated |
| Whether signatures collected by circulator Felipe were invalid because he was not a district resident when collecting | ABECS: Felipe maintained a Lancaster residence and thus satisfied residency requirement | School Dist.: Felipe lived in a York halfway house as parole condition and reported York as residence; signatures invalid | Court: Trial court’s finding that Felipe resided in York was supported by substantial evidence; striking his signatures was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Capital Acad. Charter Sch. v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist., 934 A.2d 189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (addressed petition-signature defects and use of PDE-377 template)
- In re K.L.S., 934 A.2d 1244 (Pa. 2007) (statutory use of the term "petition" indicates petition practice governs and post-trial motions are not required)
- Coco Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 608 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 1992) (post-trial motions not required or permissible in proceedings governed by petition practice)
- Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163 (Pa. 1993) (trial court has authority to reconsider its own judgment)
- Oberneder v. Link Computer Corp., 696 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1997) (use of mandatory "shall" in statute indicates requirement is mandatory)
